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STATE DEFENDANTS' REPLY TO 
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF 
State Defendants Kari Cunningham, Richard Anderson, and Susan Eisenman 
respectfully submit their reply to Plaintiffs' supplemental brief. 
Introduction 
Plaintiffs sued State Defendants and others in Utah's Third District Court for 
violations of the Utah and United States Constitutions, and for the common law torts of 
malicious prosecution/wrongful initiation of civil process and for intentional infliction of 
emotional distress stemming from a 2003 juvenile court proceeding. Defendants removed 
the action federal court, where State Defendants moved for summary judgment. In 
September 2008, U.S. District Court Judge Ted Stewart granted in part those motions; 
dismissing Plaintiffs' claims under the U.S. Constitution but remanding the state law 
claims to state court. Plaintiffs appealed that decision to the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Tenth Circuit Court, which court upheld, in part, the federal court's 
conclusions in a published decision issued May 5, 2010. See Jensen v. Wagner, et al, 
603 F.3d 1182 (10th Cir. 2010), attached as Addendum A.1 
1
 In pertinent part, the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals found that the 
Rooker-Feldman doctrine deprived the trial court of subject matter jurisdiction 
over Plaintiffs' malicious prosecution claim and the Court therefore dismissed 
Plaintiffs' Fourth Amendment claims. Jensen, 603 F.3d at 1193-94. The Court 
also found that defendants Eisenman and Albritton were absolutely immune from 
Plaintiffs' suit. Id. at 1194-96. Finally, the Court determined that the remaining 
defendants were entitled to qualified immunity, because (1) under the 
circumstances, the scope of Plaintiffs' alleged right to direct their child's medical 
care was not clearly established at the time of the alleged actions, id. at 1197-98; 
In the time intervening, State Defendants moved in Utah's state court for summary 
judgment dismissing Plaintiffs' remaining state law claims, which the state trial court 
granted. Plaintiffs appealed that judgment here. 
The parties fully-briefed Plaintiffs' appeal and this Court held oral argument on 
March 31, 2010, where all of Plaintiffs' claims were considered. Notwithstanding, on 
May 13, this Court issued a Supplemental Briefing Order, directing the parties to submit 
yet more briefing on Plaintiffs' pending constitutional claims.2 But despite this Court's 
lifeline, Plaintiffs have still failed to meet the stringent test that this Court articulated in 
Spackman v. Board of Education of the Box Elder County School District, 2000 UT 87, 
16 P.3d 533. State Defendants thus ask this Court to affirm the state court's order and to 
dismiss Plaintiffs' state law claims with prejudice. 
ARGUMENT 
Here, Plaintiffs make a final, failed attempt to articulate and then to support the 
contours of the state constitutional rights they contend State Defendants violated. In 
(2) Plaintiffs experienced only a minimal burden on their right to associate as a 
family, id. at 1198-99; and (3) Plaintiffs' failed to show that any defendant 
violated their right to procedural due process or that Utah's child welfare statutes 
gave rise to a constitutionally protected due process claim. Id. at 1199-1201. 
Plaintiffs have petitioned for en banc rehearing of that decision. 
2
 That order restricts the number of pages the parties may file and 
prescribes a list of questions to be answered. For brevity and to aid this Court's 
consideration of the supplemental questions, State Defendants have combined, in 
large part, their answers to questions La. and 3.a. 
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contravention of the Court's order, Plaintiffs offer little statutory and no historical support 
for their claims. And with the exception of Plaintiffs' Article I, section 7 assertions, they 
make no attempt to provide the Court with supporting case law. Even then, the law that 
Plaintiffs point to fails under the scrutiny of Spackman. The trial court's dismissal is 
sound and should be affirmed. 
I. PLAINTIFFS HAVE FAILED TO ARTICULATE ANY 
ACTIONABLE RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 1 OF THE 
UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Plaintiffs still cannot articulate any Article 1, section 1 interests. In fact, Plaintiffs 
concede "[t]here are no Utah cases in which the parties have raised Art. 1 § 1 in the 
parent-child context." Supp Br., p. 3. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs argue that because section 1 
promotes the "the inherent rights of defending life and liberty" and because this Court has 
determined that parents possess an inherent right to rear their children, see In re. J.P., 648 
P.2d 1364 (Utah 1981); Wells v. Children's Aid Soc. of Utah, 681 P.2d 199 (Utah 1984), 
Article I, section 1 necessarily promotes the fundamental liberty interests that Plaintiffs 
articulate here. But that argument fails both this Court's supplemental mandate - to 
support with case law, statute, or historical evidence the contours of the rights now 
asserted - as well as the flagrant violation prong of this Court's prior decision in 
Spackman. See id., 2000 UT 87, If 23 and discussion at Point V, infra. Because even 
Plaintiffs must acknowledge that Article I, section 1 provides them with no right of 
action, any claims arising out of that provision must be denied, and the trial court's 
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dismissal should be affirmed. 
II. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT SUPPORT THE CONTOURS OF THEIR 
ALLEGED DUE PROCESS RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 
7 OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
State Defendants readily agree that Utah courts recognize that a parent possesses a 
fundamental right to maintain ties to his or her child. J.P., 648 P.2d at 1377; Wells, 681 
P.2d at 204. But that right is no different than the fundamental rights that federal courts 
have long-recognized under the United States Constitution. 
Even this Court has 
. . . conclude[d] that the Utah Constitution recognizes and 
protects the inherent and retained right of a parent to maintain 
parental ties to his or her child under Article I, § 7 and § 25 
and that the United States Constitution recognizes the same 
right under the Ninth and Fourteenth Amendments. 
J.P., 648 P.2d at 1377 (emphasis added). And though fundamental, parental rights are 
neither limitless nor absolute. Id. But "the welfare of the child is the paramount 
consideration" and the state - as parens patriae - possesses the authority and obligation to 
step in when a parent fails to adequately safeguard that welfare. Id. (citing Santosky v. 
Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 102 S.Ct. 1388, 1401 n. 17 (1982); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 
U.S. 158, 166 (1944)); see also id. at 1382, Stewart J., dissenting on other grounds 
("[T]he correlative of parental rights is parental duties. When parents fail to, or are 
incapable of, performing their parental obligations, the child's welfare must prevail over 
the right of the parent."). 
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On supplemental briefing, Plaintiffs do not allege that State Defendants violated 
this basic right to maintain parental ties with P.J. - i.e. their right of familial association3 
- but Plaintiffs maintain that they possess and that State Defendants violated other 
alleged interests and constitutional guarantees. Plaintiffs describe those interests as 
Parents' right to direct P.J.'s medical care and to follow the recommendations of a 
physician of Parents' own choosing.4 Supp. Br., p. 1,4. But neither in J.P., nor in any 
other case addressing the right of familial association, has this Court recognized the rights 
that Plaintiffs now suggest. 
A. Utah Law Does Not Recognize a Separate Right to Direct Medical 
Care or to Follow Medical Recommendations of a Physician of 
Parents' Own Choosing. 
The contours of Plaintiffs' claimed, fundamental right to direct their child's 
medical care, or the corollary right to follow the recommendations of a licensed physician 
3
 Plaintiffs have thus abandoned this claim and this Court should find that 
Plaintiffs have waived any arguments that they may previously have advanced 
under aegis of "the right to familial association." 
4
 The Plaintiff Parents also argue that they possess the right not to be 
reported to the State for neglect because they are seeking a confirmatory diagnosis. 
Apnt. Supp. Br., p. 5. Because that claim pertains only to Defendant Wagner, 
whom the district court determined made the medical neglect referral to DCFS, 
State Defendants do not respond. But those defendants underscore that Plaintiffs 
were able to obtain confirmatory diagnoses. In fact, they received multiple 
confirmations. See e.g., Jensen, 603 F.3d at 1188-92 & 1198 ("The record 
demonstrates that no less than seven qualified and competent doctors evaluated 
P.J., diagnosed him with life-threatening cancer, and recommended that he 
immediately undergo chemotherapy in order to save his life."). 
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of their own choosing finds no support in state or federal law. In fact, no decision by this 
Court, the Tenth Circuit, or even the United States Supreme Court has clearly established 
such a right. Nonetheless, Plaintiffs unabashedly claim that it has been settled in Utah 
since 1981 that it violates Art. 1 section 7 of the Utah Constitution for a state actor to 
interfere with a parent's fundamental right to direct his or her child's medical care. Supp. 
Br., p. 2. 
But neither in J.P. ~ a case this Court decided in 1981 — nor in Dubbs v. Head 
Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1203 (10th Cir. 2003) - the case that Plaintiffs' now rely on -
did the court determine whether the Utah Constitution promotes a parent's right to direct 
a child's medical care. But in J.P., this Court considered only and thus determined that 
an amendment to the parental termination statute violated the Utah constitution, see In re 
J.P., 648 P.2d at 1365-1366 and in Dubbs, the Tenth Circuit declined, in part, the 
plaintiffs' invitation there to find that parents possess such a right under the Fourteenth 
Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. See Dubbs, 336 F.3d at 1203-1204. 
In Dubbs, the Tenth Circuit merely acknowledged that "[i]t is not implausible to 
think that the rights invoked here - the right to refuse a medical exam and the parent's 
right to control the upbringing, including the medical care, of a child - fall within this 
sphere of protected liberty." Id. at 1203. But that court expressly "decline[d] to resolve 
the difficult question." Id. at 1204. And perhaps more to the point here, in the federal 
appeal of this case, the Tenth Circuit rejected Plaintiffs' misplaced reliance on Dubbs and 
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Plaintiffs' assumption that under the circumstances of this case, they possessed a clearly 
established right to direct PJ. 's medical care. Jensen, 603 F.3d at 1197-98. 
But as State Defendants have done, the Tenth Circuit "acknowledged] that the 
Due Process Clause generally provides constitutional protection for parental rights," id. at 
1197, and underscored that although that court had "never specifically recognized or 
defined the scope of a right to direct [a] child's medical care," it did not "doubt that a 
parent's general right to make decisions concerning the care of [a] child includes, to some 
extent, a more specific right to make decisions about the child's medical care." Id. (citing 
Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1246-47 & n. 14 (10th Cir. 2003) (recognizing that/A 
re J.P. addressed only termination of parental rights and stating "[w]e express no opinion 
on whether [a right to direct medical care] might exist within the context of general 
familial rights") and Dubbs, 326 F.3d at 1203); see Apee's Ans. Br., p. 55-57. The Tenth 
Circuit likewise noted that though the U.S. Supreme Court had alluded to a right to direct 
medical care, even that Court "never specifically defined the scope" of this right. Id. 
(citing Parham v. J.R., 442 U.S. 584, 603 (1979)). The court thus concluded that this 
"precedent reasonably suggests] that the Due Process Clause provides some level of 
protection for parents' decisions regarding their children's medical care," id., but the 
court made certain that as with other parental rights, a right to direct medical care is "not 
absolute." Id. at 1197-98 (emphasis added) (citing Prince, 321 U.S. 166 (stating rights of 
"parenthood" are not "beyond limitation"); see also Parham, 442 U.S. at 604 ("Parents 
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cannot always have absolute and unreviewable discretion to decide whether to [seek 
specific medical care for their children]/' but they "retain plenary authority to seek such 
care . . . subject to a physician's independent examination and medical judgment.") 
(emphasis added). 
Inexplicably, Plaintiffs ignore this authority. This Court should not, for it compels 
the Court to reject Plaintiffs' claim. 
B. Utah Law Does Not Recognize a Protected Liberty Interest in a 
Child Welfare Investigation. 
Utah's child welfare statutes observe a parent's substantive rights under the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution to conceive and raise children, see Utah 
Code Ann. § 62A-4a-201(l)(a) (2003), and they promote the State's public policy that 
parents retain a similar right and duty to care for, supervise and to educate their children. 
Id. at § 62A-4a-201(l)(b). But those statues fall far short of creating a protected liberty 
interest in any particular procedure, let alone an independent child welfare investigation.5 
Throughout, Plaintiffs have maintained that Defendant Cunningham 
conducted no investigation, at all. But that misstates the facts. Prior to initiating 
judicial action, Cunningham received PCMC's referral and opened a child welfare 
case. She investigated the basis of that referral by contacting Drs. Wagner and 
Corwin and by receiving and reviewing their notes regarding PJ. 's diagnosis and 
needs, and also, the hospital's contacts with the Parents. Cunningham staffed the 
matter with attorneys from the Office of the Guardian ad Litem and the Utah 
Attorney General. And she convened and conducted a multidisciplinary staffing 
respecting P.J.'s case and medical needs. It is true that Cunningham did not 
second guess PCMC's pathology results or Dr. Wagner's recommendations, but 
there is no evidence that she had any reason to doubt the veracity of the 
information contained therein. There is also no evidence that Cunningham had any 
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But here, as before, Plaintiffs put forth no Utah case that supports their contention. 
And though Plaintiffs assert that this claim is consistent with the Utah Court of Appeals' 
decision in Peterson v. Utah Bd. of Pardons, 931 P.2d 147, 150 (Utah App. 1997), that 
case is neither on point, nor helpful. 
In Peterson, the court of appeals emphasized that Article I, section 7 promotes a 
prison inmate's right to procedural - not substantive - due process relative to his or her 
parole hearing. Id. The court neither addressed nor held that the statutes governing parol 
hearings created a liberty interest in a hearing or provided any, other substantive 
guarantee. Id., generally. 
Moreover, the U.S. Supreme Court has rejected a similar argument that, standing 
alone, a state enforcement statute creates a due process-protected liberty interest. See 
Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545 U.S. 748, 765 (2005) ("[I] f [plaintiff] was given a 
statutory entitlement, we would expect to see some indication of that in the statute 
itself."). But on this point, the Supreme Court has found that a state creates a liberty 
interest only "by establishing substantive procedures to govern official decision-making . 
•. and by mandating the outcome to be reached upon a finding that the criteria have been 
met." Kentucky v. Dep 't ofCorr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 461-62 (1989) (citation 
omitted). Both elements are crucial and necessary to create a liberty interest. Id. at 462. 
reason to delay the onset of judicial action - but the evidence is undisputed that 
she believed P.J.'s case constituted an emergency. See Apee's Ans. Br., Statement 
of the Facts at pp. 12-14 and record citations contained therein. 
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And under similar facts, a United States District Court for the District of Colorado 
rejected a plaintiffs claim that by mandating that child abuse be reported and properly 
investigated, Colorado's child protection scheme created a liberty interest in the same. 
See Pierce v. Delta County Dep 't ofSoc. Servs., 119 F. Supp.2d 1139, 1153 (D.Colo. 
2000). There, the court found that because the statute merely mandated a procedure - i.e., 
an investigation - without also demanding a particular outcome, the statute failed to 
create a due process-protected liberty interest. Id. The court determined that the statute 
gave the plaintiff instead and at best, only "an expectation of receiving certain process." 
Id. (citation omitted). And in the companion, federal appeal of this case, the Tenth 
Circuit agreed. Jensen, 603 F.3d at 1199-1200. 
In the absence of any showing by Plaintiffs that apart from directing that an 
investigation occur, that Utah's statutes also mandate a specific outcome as result of that 
investigation, Plaintiffs have failed to establish a constitutionally cognizable liberty 
interest in Utah's child welfare statutes, in general, or in a child welfare investigation, 
specifically. The trial court's grant of summary judgment should therefore be affirmed. 
C. The Common Law Does Not Create Broader Procedural Due 
Process Rights. 
Just as Utah law recognizes a parent's fundamental right to maintain ties to his or 
her child, the common law recognizes that that right cannot be disturbed without adequate 
due process. See Wells, 681 P.2d at 204. And like the liberty interest that it promotes, 
Plaintiffs' right to procedural due process here is no broader under the Utah Constitution 
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than under its federal counterpart. 
Parties to a judicial proceeding are entitled to notice of the issue under 
consideration and an opportunity to present argument on that issue before a decision is 
rendered. See Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, f 68, 100 P.3d 177. The "test of procedural 
due process, is fairness." Wells, 681 P.2d at 204; see Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 
651-58 (1972) ("state may not deprive a person of her liberty interest without a fair 
procedure for that deprivation."). 
Plaintiffs vaguely acknowledge this authority, but stridently maintain that as a 
matter of "common sense" a parent's procedural due process can never be preserved in 
the face of an alleged misrepresentation. Supp. Br., p. 7. But Plaintiffs have evinced no 
case law by this or any other court that holds that a parent's right to procedural due 
process is, per se, violated in the face of an alleged misrepresentation, however slight. 
Plaintiffs have also brought forth no authority - and State Defendants have researched 
and have found none - that procedural due process is likewise violated in the face of an 
in-court misrepresentation or omission that is immaterial to the matter at hand, or that the 
plaintiff had the ability, but knowingly failed to correct. Finally, Plaintiffs have yet to 
point to any decision making clear that procedural due process is violated when a 
government actor makes a misstatement in open court, in a proceeding where the plaintiff 
is represented by counsel. But courts have held the opposite. 
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In Spielman v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377 (10th Cir. 1989), the plaintiffs argued 
that a defendant social worker who misrepresented information to a state court during a 
child custody proceeding violated the plaintiffs' procedural due process. Id. at 1382. The 
appellate court disagreed, finding that where the plaintiffs were afforded a court hearing, 
were notified of the hearing and attended with counsel, and were given the opportunity to 
present evidence and to confront the same, they had "failed to allege a constitutional 
deprivation." Id. (cited by Cline v. State, 2005 UT App. 498, 142 P.3d 127, rehg and 
cert, denied). 
Because the standards of due process were met in this case and because Plaintiffs 
have adduced no authority to rebut that conclusion, the trial court's decision should be 
affirmed. 
III. PLAINTIFFS CANNOT SUPPORT THE CONTOURS OF THE 
ALLEGED RIGHT TO BE FREE FROM UNREASONABLE 
NONCUSTODIAL SEIZURES UNDER ARTICLE I, SECTION 14 OF 
THE UTAH CONSTITUTION. 
Article 1, section 14 of the Utah Constitution promotes a generalized right to be 
free from unreasonable or unlawful, custodial seizures. But no section 14 rights are 
violated when — as here ~ a seizure is supported by probable cause. And nothing in 
Utah's Constitution or its common law promotes Plaintiffs' claim that section 14 
recognizes the concept of a "continued seizure" or promotes a right to be free from non-
custodial seizures. Those claims have never been recognized as a matter of state law. 
But the concept has been expressly rejected by a plurality of the United States Supreme 
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Court, see Albright v. Oliver, 510 U.S. 266 (1994), by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, 
see Becker v. Kroll, 494 F.3d 904, 915 (10th Cir. 2007); and by the U.S. District Court in 
this case. See Jensen v. Wagner, et al, 2008 WL 4372933, Memorandum Decision & 
Order at *28-29 (D. Utah, Sept. 22, 2008). 
IV. THE UNDISPUTED FACTS BELIE PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS. 
Defendant Eisenman. Plaintiffs sued Eisenman for alleged "non-prosecutorial 
functions" relative to P J. 's case, including investigative and complaining witness 
functions. On supplemental briefing, Plaintiffs continue to allege that (1) Eisenman made 
factual misrepresentations or omissions to the state juvenile court, to her clients and co-
counsel, and to a deputy district attorney, and (2) Eisenman engaged in other, 
investigative functions. Even had those claims found support in the record, because of all 
of Eisenman's conduct fell squarely within her role as the state's attorney, she is 
absolutely immune from suit. 
Eisenman's relationship with Cunningham and Anderson was that of attorney-
client and her relationship with AG Shurtleff was as co-counsel. Eisenman's 
communications with those persons were directly related to the Juvenile Court 
proceedings, and assuming alleged misrepresentations took place, because the 
communications were connected to Eisenman's ability to present the State's case, they 
satisfy the guiding principle of prosecutorial immunity - proximity to the judicial process 
and the initiation and presentation of the state's case. See Black v. Clegg, 938 P.2d 
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293,296 (Utah 1997); Bailey v. Utah State Bar, 846 P.2d 1278 (Utah 1993). 
And though Eisenman provided information to the DDA, she did so only to 
effectuate the juvenile court's order of protective custody: an action unquestionably 
connected to her duties to the Juvenile Court. See Black, 938 P.2d at 296 (immunity 
"attached to [an attorney's] function, not the manner in which [s]he perform[s] it.") see 
also Ans. Br, Statement of Facts, pp. 16-17, 23-25. That conclusion applied equally to 
Eisenman's alleged, investigative functions. See Statement of Facts, pp. 15-16. 
Moreover, because the federal court determined the threshold issue of Eisenman's 
absolute immunity in prior litigation, the district court correctly estopped Plaintiffs from 
relitigating that issue. See Ans. Br., pp. 31-47. So too should this court. 
Defendant Cunningham. 
Plaintiffs have pointed to no evidence that Ms. Cunningham had reason to suspect 
that the information and opinions given to her by Drs. Wagner and Corwin were 
misleading. See Ans. Br., Statement of Facts, pp. 12-13, and n. 5, supra. The federal 
court analyzed Cunningham's alleged misrepresentations and omissions, and found that 
"[ajssuming the Jensens' version of the facts, the misrepresentations . . . do not establish a 
constitutional violation," Jensen, 2008 WL 4372933 at * 23, and that "[t]he alleged 
misrepresentations and omissions were of little, if any, consequence." Id.; see R. 3918-29 
(Add 2 to Cunningham's Reply in Supt of MS J). Moreover, the record of the juvenile 
court proceedings belie Plaintiffs' claims. See Statement of Fact, supra, pp. 18-20; R. 
-14-
3918-29. 
Defendant Anderson. 
Plaintiffs complained that Defendant Anderson violated their state constitutional 
rights by (1) interfering with the Plaintiff parents' ability to take P.J. to a physician of 
their choice; (2) refusing to immediately dismiss the juvenile court action, and (3) failing 
to disclose information to the juvenile court. 
But Anderson's involvement in P.J.'s case did not begin until late August 2003 
and was limited to negotiating a resolve to the case between the state and the Plaintiff 
parents. See Statement of Facts, p 26-27. By the time Anderson became involved, the 
juvenile court had already ordered P.J. to begin chemotherapy administered by a board-
certified pediatric oncologist by August 8, 2003 and had placed him in the state's 
protective custody because the Plaintiff parents had, by then, missed that deadline. See 
Statement of Facts, p. 26. Moreover, Anderson's position that P. J. be treated by a board-
certified pediatric oncologist was in accord with both the juvenile court's orders and the 
opinion of Dr. Tishler, a physician whom Parents self-selected. See Statement of Facts, 
supra, pp. 18-20, 26-27. 
Plaintiffs have still not directed the Court to evidence that Anderson knew the 
juvenile court was not aware of the possibility of genetic testing or that genetic tests were 
definitive, because Plaintiffs repeatedly stated their own desire for further testing during 
the juvenile court proceedings. Plaintiffs have not shown that Anderson understood that 
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if Dr. Johnston diagnosed P.J. before genetic testing was complete that that breached the 
September 5 stipulation or resulted in a violation of Plaintiffs' constitutional rights. But 
the established facts reveal that despite the September 5 stipulation, Plaintiffs refused to 
follow Dr. Johnston's treatment recommendations, which lead, in part, to DCFS's 
decision to dismiss the case. See Statement of Fact, supra, pp. 28-29. 
V. PLAINTIFFS' CLAIMS FAIL THE TEST THAT THIS COURT 
ARTICULATED IN SPACEMAN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION. 
Even assuming that Plaintiffs have sufficiently articulated a claim under the Utah 
Constitution, this Court should affirm the district court's dismissal under Spackman v. 
Board of Education of Education of Box Elder County School District, 2000 UT 87, 16 
P.3d 533. There, the Court noted that the common law gives the judiciary authority to 
provide civil remedies for constitutional violations only under appropriate circumstances. 
Id. at \ 20. First, the plaintiff must establish that the provision at issue is a "self-
executing" clause. Id. at f^ 7. Next, to proceed with a private suit for damages under a 
constitutional tort theory, a plaintiff must show: 1) that he or she suffered a "flagrant" 
violation of a known constitutional right; 2) that existing remedies do not redress the 
plaintiffs injuries; and 3) that equitable relief, such as an injunction, "was or is wholly 
inadequate to protect the plaintiffs rights or redress" the alleged harm. Id. at ^[ 23-25. 
A. Self Executing Clauses. 
A constitutional clause is self-executing if it "articulates a rule sufficient" to be 
"judicially enforced without implementing legislation." Id. at f 7. "Conversely," a 
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constitutional clause is not self-executing if it "merely indicate[s] a general principle or 
line of policy without supplying the means for putting [the provision] into effect." Id. 
Plaintiffs assert claims under Article I, sections 1, 7 and 14 of the State constitution. 
In Spackman, this Court has found that Article I, section 7 is self-executing. Id at 
Tf 10. And though the Court has never held that Article I, section 14 is self-executing, 
given its prohibitory language and express purpose, State Defendants assume for purposes 
of this appeal that it is. 
Conversely, Article 1, section 1 is not self-executing. That section neither 
prohibits nor mandates government action. But the section expresses only a statement of 
inherent and inalienable rights. The provision is a policy statement. And no precedent 
exists for the assertion that Article I, section 1 is self-executing. Further, the mere fact 
that this Court has - on other occasions inapposite to the one at hand - applied section 1 
absent implementing legislation, does not alter that conclusion. See id. at f 8 
(constitutional provision that prohibits certain government conduct may qualify as self-
executing "at least to the extent that courts may void incongruous legislation.") (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted); but see, Apnt. Supp. Br., p. 12 and cases cited 
thereat.6 Article I, section 1 fails Spackman 's first, mandatory test; accordingly, 
6
 Notably, in none of the cases that Plaintiffs cite were the underlying 
plaintiffs alleging a constitutional tort or seeking an award of money damages 
But in each instance, the plaintiff was challenging the constitutionality of an 
ordinance or other regulation. 
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Plaintiffs' section 1 claims must also fail. 
B. No Flagrant Violations of Clearly Established 
Utah Law. 
This Court has stated that the flagrant violation element 
means that a defendant must have violated a clearly 
established constitutional right of which a reasonable person 
would have known. To be considered clearly established, the 
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that a 
reasonable official would understand that what he [or she] 
was doing violates that right. 
Id. In the federal courts, "[f]or the law to be clearly established, there must be a Supreme 
Court or Tenth Circuit decision on point, or the clearly established weight of authority 
from other courts must be as plaintiff maintains;" Holland v. Harrington, 268 F.3d 1179, 
1189 n. 13 (10th Cir. 2001), a test that this Court has stated is "reasonable." See Dexter v. 
Bosko, 2008 UT 29, 184 P.3d 592 ("[Defendants] argue that because there was no 
meaningful Utah law establishing the contours or the [clause], the right... was not then a 
clearly established right. Defendants make a reasonable point.") Even now, Plaintiffs 
cannot meet this test. 
First, though giving lip-service to Spackman, Plaintiffs have not complied with the 
rigors of that case or with this Court's supplemental briefing order. But Plaintiffs merely 
contend that by having, finally, articulated alleged rights that Plaintiffs claim they 
possess, that those rights are necessarily established. But a litigant cannot establish a 
constitutional right on his or her say so alone. 
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The law demands much more. 
And as State Defendants have made painstakingly clear, see Reply to Supp. Br. at 
pp. 3-13, supra, Plaintiffs have nowhere established that the contours of the rights that 
they now assert are supported by Utah law. For that reason alone, Plaintiffs' appeal must 
fail. 
Opting to side-step this aspect of Spackman, Plaintiffs attempt to focus this Court's 
attention, instead, on the alleged conduct that Plaintiffs' believe violates their newly-
stated rights. And even were that procedure correct, neither the law nor the settled facts 
support Plaintiffs' contentions. 
Plaintiffs maintain State Defendants violated their state constitutional rights by 
making misrepresentations or omissions during, or to others involved in, the juvenile 
court proceedings. And even assuming that any of the State Defendants misstated or 
omitted information during the juvenile court proceedings, Plaintiffs have still not pointed 
to any decision - by this or any other Court - holding that when a government actor 
makes misstatements, misrepresentations, or omissions in open-court, in a civil 
proceedings where the opponent is represented by counsel who can or should correct any 
misstatements, that due process has been violated. But see Spielman, 873 F.2d 1377, 
1380-85 (10th Cir. 1989). Moreover, even had Plaintiffs shown that State Defendants 
were mistaken in their dealings with them or the juvenile court, the law forgives them for 
such human frailties. See Spackman, 2000 UT 87, f 23 ("The requirement that the 
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unconstitutional conduct be flagrant ensures that a government employee is allowed the 
ordinary human frailties of forgetfulness, distractibility, or misjudgment without 
rendering him or herself liable for a constitutional violation"); Bott v. DeLand, 922 P.2d 
732, 738 (Utah 1996) ("The only common feature of all of these cases is that they hold 
that simple negligence is not sufficient justification for a [constitutional] damages 
claim.") 
And though State Defendants concede that there may be circumstances in which 
false testimony, omission, or misstatements may infect a judicial proceeding to the point 
that the proceeding becomes unconstitutional, Plaintiffs have not shown in the context of 
this case that that occurred. But the undisputed facts - as supported by the records and 
found by two federal courts - demonstrate that no, alleged misstatements had such a 
degenerative impact on the juvenile court proceedings to render them a nullity. See 
Jensen, 603 F.3d at 1200. Plaintiffs have yet to overcome that determination. 
C. Existing Remedies Were Available to Redress 
Plaintiffs' Injury. 
Before a plaintiff may proceed in damages on a state constitutional tort, he or she 
must establish that no existing remedy can redress his or her injury. Spackman, 2000 UT 
87 at f 24. That requirement "is meant to ensure that courts use their common law 
remedial power cautiously and in favor of existing remedies." Id, (citing Lynch v. 
Jacobsen, 55 Utah 129,138-39, 184 P.929, 933 (1919) (finding that constitutional 
liability may only be enforced in the absence of a "known remedy"). 
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For their part, Plaintiffs suggest that there were no other remedies at their disposal 
and which could redress their injury. But there were myriad remedies at Plaintiffs' 
disposal; Plaintiffs' converse argument misses the point. 
At the outset, Plaintiffs could have avoided any of their now-alleged harms by 
conforming their own conduct. Namely, Plaintiffs could have neither proposed nor 
entered into the July 10, 2003 stipulation which gave rise to the juvenile court's July 28 
treatment order and its August 8 custody order. Having made that stipulation, Plaintiffs 
could simply have adhered to the terms of the stipulation and followed the juvenile 
court's subsequent orders. Plaintiffs could have, but failed, to move in time and under the 
proper procedures, to set aside or to stay the terms of Plaintiffs' stipulations or the court's 
orders. And Plaintiffs easily possessed the ability to petition Utah's appellate courts for 
permission to file an interlocutory appeal or for extraordinary relief. 
Next, Plaintiffs completely ignore the other remedies that were at their disposal 
and that Plaintiffs, in fact, pursued. In addition to suing State Defendants for violation of 
their rights under the Utah Constitution, Plaintiffs also sued State Defendants under 42 
U.S.C. § 1983 for violation of Plaintiffs' federal, constitutional rights. And while this 
Court has "not reach[ed] the question of whether existing federal law remedies should 
preclude a state court from awarding damages for a state constitutional tort," id. n. 10, 
other courts have. And there, the courts have found that a party may not recover for a 
state constitutional violation in the absence of any showing that existing remedies under 
-21-
42 U.S.C. § 1983 do not redress the injury. See Nielson v. City of So. Salt Lake, 2009 WL 
3562081 at *9, No. 06-0335 (D. Utah, Oct. 22, 2009) (unpublished decision and order); 
Cavanaugh v. Wood Cross City, 2009 WL 4981591 at * 6, No. 08-0032 (D. Utah, Dec. 
14,2009) (slip op). Plaintiffs have not made that showing. Finally, Plaintiffs have also 
not shown that their state common law intentional infliction of emotional distress and 
wrongful initiation of civil and criminal process claims were insufficient to remedy an 
alleged injury. They were. 
It is not State Defendants' burden to show that existing remedies are sufficient; it 
is Plaintiffs' burden to establish that they are not. See Spacbnan, 2000 UT 87 at ^ 34. 
But State Defendants have more than adequately provided this Court with grounds to 
affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment and to deny the relief that Plaintiffs 
seek here. 
D. Equitable Relief. 
Finally, to prevail under Spackman, Plaintiffs were required, but have also failed to 
show that equitable relief was or is wholly inadequate to protect Plaintiffs' claimed rights 
or to redress their claimed harm. This Court's position is clear, when an alleged injury 
"can be undone" by the judiciary, money damages constitute an inappropriate remedy to 
redress a constitutional violation. See id. at % 25; see also id. at n. 11 (finding procedural 
due process claims particularly amenable to redress through equitable means) and at n. 12 
(stating that forceful arguments have long-been made that equitable relief is superior to 
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damages as redress for constitutional torts). Unsurprisingly, Plaintiffs ignore this as well. 
Plaintiffs are not entitled to sit on their rights while allowing alleged damages to 
incur. Plaintiffs possessed notice of the juvenile court proceedings, and they possessed 
avenues to object or to appeal from those proceedings and their aftermath. And while 
equitable relief might be pointless today, Plaintiffs have not shown - nor can they - that 
such relief was inadequate at the time the juvenile court case was pending. Instead, 
Plaintiffs point, without analysis, to inapposite decisions that this Court cited in 
Spackman. But in those instances, injunctive relief would not be appropriate, because, on 
the one hand unnecessary rigor had already occurred, see Bott, 922 P.2d at 739, and other 
hand reinstatement of the plaintiffs employment was not possible because the former 
employer was also not then-employed. Davis v. Passman, 442 U.S. 228, 245 (1979). 
Neither case pertains here. 
Plaintiffs cannot show that an appeal, writ, or petition for an injunction or stay 
while the juvenile court action was then-pending was not available to them or would not 
have vindicated their rights. That was Plaintiffs' burden here. Plaintiffs have failed to 
carry that burden and the trial court's order granting summary judgment should be 
affirmed. 
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CONCLUSION 
In prior briefing, Plaintiffs failed to show that the district court erred when it 
granted State Defendants' motions for summary judgment and dismissed Plaintiffs' state 
claims under res judicata. In this brief, Plaintiffs failed to show that that dismissal should 
be reversed under the principles this Court announced in Spackman. By any measure, the 
trial court's decision is correct and State Defendants ask this Court to affirm the Final 
Judgment and Order. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted this 10th day of June, 2010. 
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H 
United States Court of Appeals, 
Tenth Circuit. 
PJ, a minor, by and through his parents and natural 
guardians Barbara and Daren JENSEN; Daren 
Jensen, individually; Barbara Jensen, individually, 
Plaintiffs-Appellants/Cross-Appellees, 
v. 
Lars M. WAGNER, in his individual capacity; Kar-
en H. Albritton, in her individual capacity, Defend-
ants-Appellees/Cross-Appellants, 
and 
Kari Cunningham, in her individual capacity; 
Richard Anderson, in his individual and official ca-
pacities; Susan Eisenman, in her individual capa-
city, Defendants-Appellees. 
Nos. 08-4197, 08-4206. 
May 5, 2010. 
Background: Minor child and parents brought § 
1983 action against Utah state actors involved in 
state juvenile court legal dispute over child's cus-
tody and medical care after child was diagnosed 
with cancer, alleging violations of their substantive 
and procedural due process rights, and their Fourth 
Amendment right to be free from unreasonable 
seizure. After case was removed to federal court, 
the United States District Court for the District of 
Utah, Ted Stewart, J., 2008 WL 4372933, granted 
summary judgment in favor of all defendants. Par-
ents appealed, and two state actors cross-appealed 
denial of summary judgment based on their juris-
dictional argument. 
Holdings: The Court of Appeals, Tacha, Circuit 
Judge, held that: 
(1) parents' substantive and procedural due process 
claims were not barred by the Rooker- Feldman 
doctrine; 
(2) parents' malicious prosecution claims were 
barred by the Rooker- Feldman doctrine; 
(3) Utah state attorney was entitled to absolute im-
Page 1 
munity; 
(4) parents did not have a clearly established consti-
tutional right to direct child's medical care; 
(5) state actors did not violate parents' associational 
rights; and 
(6) parents failed to establish a violation of their 
procedural due process rights. 
Affirmed in part and reversed in part. 
West Headnotes 
[1] Federal Courts 170B €==>776 
170B Federal Courts 
170BVIII Courts of Appeals 
170BVIII(K) Scope, Standards, and Extent 
170BVIII(K)1 In General 
170Bk776 k. Trial de novo. Most Cited 
Cases 
Federal Courts 170B €^>802 
170B Federal Courts 
170BVIII Courts of Appeals 
170BVIII(K) Scope, Standards, and Extent 
170BVIII(K)3 Presumptions 
170Bk802 k. Summary judgment. 
Most Cited Cases 
A district court's decision to grant summary judg-
ment is reviewed de novo, with facts viewed in the 
light most favorable to the nonmoving party. 
[2] Courts 106 €=^509 
106 Courts 
106VII Concurrent and Conflicting Jurisdiction 
106VII(B) State Courts and United States 
Courts 
106k509 k. Vacating or annulling de-
cisions. Most Cited Cases 
Generally, the Rooker- Feldman doctrine precludes 
lower federal courts from effectively exercising ap-
pellate jurisdiction over claims actually decided by 
a state court and claims inextricably intertwined 
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with a prior state-court judgment. 
[3] Courts 106 €^>509 
106 Courts 
106VII Concurrent and Conflicting Jurisdiction 
106VII(B) State Courts and United States 
Courts 
106k509 k. Vacating or annulling de-
cisions. Most Cited Cases 
Parents' substantive and procedural due process 
claims against Utah state actors based on misrepres-
entations made during state juvenile court proceed-
ings arising from dispute over child's custody and 
medical care after child was diagnosed with cancer, 
and with respect to child's medical treatment, and 
on the Utah Division of Child and Family Services' 
(DCFS) alleged failure to conduct an independent 
investigation of child's case before filing the veri-
fied petition and motion to transfer custody and 
guardianship, sought relief independent from any 
judgment rendered by the state court in granting 
state custody over child and accepting parents' 
guilty pleas for misdemeanor custodial interference, 
and therefore were not barred by the Rooker- Feld-
man doctrine; substantive and procedural due pro-
cess claims would have been identical even if there 
would have been no state-court orders adverse to 
the parents. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[4] Courts 106 € ^ 5 0 9 
106 Courts 
106VII Concurrent and Conflicting Jurisdiction 
106VII(B) State Courts and United States 
Courts 
106k509 k. Vacating or annulling de-
cisions. Most Cited Cases 
Parents' malicious prosecution claims against Utah 
state actors involved in state juvenile court legal 
dispute over child's custody and medical care after 
child was diagnosed with cancer alleging a viola-
tion of their Fourth Amendment right to be free 
from unreasonable seizure were barred by the 
Rooker- Feldman doctrine, in light of judgments 
rendered by the state court granting state custody 
over child and accepting parents' guilty pleas for 
misdemeanor custodial interference, as a federal 
court would necessarily have had to have reviewed 
and rejected the state court judgments in order to 
have had the parents succeed on their malicious 
prosecution claims. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 4. 
[5] Federal Courts 170B €^>776 
170B Federal Courts 
170BVIII Courts of Appeals 
170BVIII(K) Scope, Standards, and Extent 
170BVIII(K)1 In General 
170Bk776 k. Trial de novo. Most Cited 
Cases 
District court's conclusion that a defendant is en-
titled to absolute immunity is reviewed de novo. 
[6] Officers and Public Employees 283 €^>114 
283 Officers and Public Employees 
283III Rights, Powers, Duties, and Liabilities 
283kll4 k. Liabilities for official acts. Most 
Cited Cases 
Absolute immunity defeats a suit at the outset, so 
long as the official's actions were within the scope 
of the immunity. 
[7] Officers and Public Employees 283 €=>114 
283 Officers and Public Employees 
283III Rights, Powers, Duties, and Liabilities 
283kll4 k. Liabilities for official acts. Most 
Cited Cases 
Under the functional approach to claims of absolute 
immunity, a court examines whether the particular 
actions of the defendant are within the scope of the 
claimed immunity, not whether the status of the de-
fendant or the office that she holds entitles her to 
protection. 
[8] Civil Rights 78 €^1376(9) 
78 Civil Rights 
78III Federal Remedies in General 
78k 1372 Privilege or Immunity; Good Faith 
and Probable Cause 
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78kl376 Government Agencies and Of-
ficers 
78kl376(9) k. Attorney General and 
prosecuting attorneys. Most Cited Cases 
State attorneys who perform functions analogous to 
those of a prosecutor in initiating and pursuing civil 
and administrative enforcement proceedings are ab-
solutely immune from suit under § 1983 concerning 
activities intimately associated with the judicial 
process, but such government actors are not im-
mune for actions that are primarily investigative or 
administrative in nature; to distinguish between the 
two types of actions, a court looks to whether the 
actions can rightly be considered advocacy because 
that is the prosecutor's main function and the one 
most akin to his quasi-judicial role. 42 U.S.C.A. § 
1983. 
[9] District and Prosecuting Attorneys 131 C=> 10 
131 District and Prosecuting Attorneys 
131kl0 k. Liabilities for official acts, negli-
gence, or misconduct. Most Cited Cases 
Absolute immunity may attach even to a state attor-
ney's administrative or investigative activities when 
these functions are necessary so that a prosecutor 
may fulfill his function as an officer of the court. 
[10] Civil Rights 78 €^1376(9) 
78 Civil Rights 
78III Federal Remedies in General 
78k 1372 Privilege or Immunity; Good Faith 
and Probable Cause 
78kl376 Government Agencies and Of-
ficers 
78kl376(9) k. Attorney General and 
prosecuting attorneys. Most Cited Cases 
Utah state attorney was entitled to absolute im-
munity from § 1983 claims of parents, which arose 
from state juvenile court legal dispute over child's 
custody and medical care after child was diagnosed 
with cancer, and were based on misrepresentations 
attorney allegedly made to juvenile court, and attor-
ney's research regarding guidelines for clinicians 
who rendered pediatric care and her resistance to 
the parents' attempt to have child treated by doctors 
who were not qualified under those guidelines; any 
statements attorney made to juvenile court were 
made in her role as an advocate for state's interest 
in the custody dispute, and any research performed 
regarding the appropriate type of doctor for child 
and any actions she took to ensure that child was 
treated by an appropriately credentialed doctor 
were intimately associated with the judicial process 
and attorney's role as an advocate for the state. 42 
U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
[11] Civil Rights 78 €^>1375 
78 Civil Rights 
78III Federal Remedies in General 
78kl372 Privilege or Immunity; Good Faith 
and Probable Cause 
78kl375 k. Attorneys, jurors, and wit-
nesses; public defenders. Most Cited Cases 
Civil Rights 78 €=^1376(9) 
78 Civil Rights 
78III Federal Remedies in General 
78k 13 72 Privilege or Immunity; Good Faith 
and Probable Cause 
78k 1376 Government Agencies and Of-
ficers 
78kl376(9) k. Attorney General and 
prosecuting attorneys. Most Cited Cases 
Utah state attorney was entitled to absolute im-
munity from § 1983 claims of parents, which arose 
from state juvenile court legal dispute over child's 
custody and medical care after child was diagnosed 
with cancer, and were based on misrepresentations 
attorney allegedly made to the county district attor-
ney which eventually led to parents' criminal pro-
secution, despite parents' argument that state attor-
ney was acting as a complaining witness rather than 
as a prosecutor; state attorney's presentation of 
evidence to district attorney was necessary to effec-
tuate juvenile court's order to parents to present 
child to the court for the purpose of beginning 
chemotherapy treatment, as the parents were aware 
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of the juvenile court order and had stated their in-
tention not to comply with it, and admitted they 
were attempting to hide child from state authorities 
in order to prevent the effectuation of the juvenile 
court order. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
[12] Torts 379 €^>122 
379 Torts 
3791 In General 
379kl20 Defenses and Mitigating Circum-
stances 
379kl22 k. Litigation privilege; witness 
immunity. Most Cited Cases 
A complaining witness is not entitled to absolute 
immunity. 
[13] Torts 379 €=>122 
379 Torts 
3791 In General 
379kl20 Defenses and Mitigating Circum-
stances 
379kl22 k. Litigation privilege; witness 
immunity. Most Cited Cases 
Testifying witness immunity is supported by the 
public policy of preserving the tmthfinding process 
from distortions caused by fear of suit. 
[14] Torts 379 C^>122 
379 Torts 
3791 In General 
379kl20 Defenses and Mitigating Circum-
stances 
379kl22 k. Litigation privilege; witness 
immunity. Most Cited Cases 
A witness is absolutely immune from civil liability 
based on any testimony the witness provides during 
a judicial proceeding even if the witness knew the 
statements were false and made them with malice. 
[15] Civil Rights 78 €=^1376(1) 
78 Civil Rights 
78III Federal Remedies in General 
78k 13 72 Privilege or Immunity; Good Faith 
and Probable Cause 
78kl376 Government Agencies and Of-
ficers 
78kl376(l) k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Civil Rights 78 €^>1376(2) 
78 Civil Rights 
78III Federal Remedies in General 
78k 13 72 Privilege or Immunity; Good Faith 
and Probable Cause 
78k 13 76 Government Agencies and Of-
ficers 
78kl376(2) k. Good faith and reason-
ableness; knowledge and clarity of law; motive and 
intent, in general. Most Cited Cases 
Civil Rights 78 €^>1407 
78 Civil Rights 
78III Federal Remedies in General 
78k 1400 Presumptions, Inferences, and Bur-
dens of Proof 
78kl407 k. Defenses; immunity and good 
faith. Most Cited Cases 
Civil Rights 78 €=^1423 
78 Civil Rights 
78III Federal Remedies in General 
78kl416 Weight and Sufficiency of Evidence 
78kl423 k. Defenses; immunity and good 
faith. Most Cited Cases 
When a defendant pleads qualified immunity, the 
plaintiff has the heavy burden of establishing: (1) 
that the defendant's actions violated a federal con-
stitutional or statutory right, and (2) that the right 
violated was clearly established at the time of the 
defendant's actions; federal courts may exercise 
their sound discretion in deciding which of the two 
prongs of the qualified immunity analysis should be 
addressed first in light of the circumstances in the 
particular case at hand. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
[16] Civil Rights 78 €^>1376(2) 
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78 Civil Rights 
78III Federal Remedies in General 
78kl372 Privilege or Immunity; Good Faith 
and Probable Cause 
78kl376 Government Agencies and Of-
ficers 
78kl376(2) k. Good faith and reason-
ableness; knowledge and clarity of law; motive and 
intent, in general. Most Cited Cases 
The "clearly established" prong of the qualified im-
munity analysis ensures that governmental actors 
are given fair warning that their conduct is uncon-
stitutional before they are held liable for damages 
based on that conduct. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
[17] Civil Rights 78 €^>1376(2) 
78 Civil Rights 
78III Federal Remedies in General 
78k 1372 Privilege or Immunity; Good Faith 
and Probable Cause 
78k 1376 Government Agencies and Of-
ficers 
78k 1376(2) k. Good faith and reason-
ableness; knowledge and clarity of law; motive and 
intent, in general. Most Cited Cases 
A right is "clearly established" under the qualified 
immunity analysis when a Supreme Court or Tenth 
Circuit decision is on point, or if the clearly estab-
lished weight of authority from other courts shows 
that the right must be as the plaintiff maintains, but 
that does not mean that a court must have previ-
ously decided a case that is materially factually 
similar or identical to the present case; instead, the 
contours of the right must be sufficiently clear that 
a reasonable official would understand that what he 
is doing violates that right. 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
[18] Civil Rights 78 €=>1376(3) 
78 Civil Rights 
78III Federal Remedies in General 
78k 1372 Privilege or Immunity; Good Faith 
and Probable Cause 
78kl376 Government Agencies and Of-
ficers 
78kl376(3) k. States and territories 
and their officers and agencies. Most Cited Cases 
After no less than seven qualified and competent 
doctors evaluated minor child, diagnosed him with 
life-threatening cancer, and recommended that he 
immediately undergo chemotherapy treatment in 
order to save his life, the child's parents did not 
have a clearly established constitutional right to re-
fuse the unanimous recommended treatment or to 
solicit additional opinions until they found a doctor 
who disagreed that conventional treatment was ne-
cessary, and therefore state actors were entitled to 
qualified immunity on parents' § 1983 claim that 
they violated the parents' substantive due process 
right to direct child's medical care. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 14; 42 U.S.C.A. § 1983. 
[191 Constitutional Law 92 €=>4391 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVII Due Process 
92XXVII(G) Particular Issues and Applica-
tions 
92XXVII(G)18 Families and Children 
92k4390 Parent and Child Relationship 
92k4391 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Due Process Clause generally provides constitu-
tional protection for parental rights. U.S.C.A. 
ConstAmend. 14. 
[20] Constitutional Law 92 € ^ 4 4 0 1 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVII Due Process 
92XXVII(G) Particular Issues and Applica-
tions 
92XXVII(G)18 Families and Children 
92k4400 Protection of Children; Child 
Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency 
92k4401 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Infants 211 €=>13 
211 Infants 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
603 F.3d 1182 
(Cite as: 603 F3d 1182) 
Page 6 
21 III Protection 
21 lkl3 k. Protection of health and morals. 
Most Cited Cases 
Infants 211 €=>154.1 
211 Infants 
211VIII Dependent, Neglected, and Delinquent 
Children 
211VIII(B) Subjects and Grounds 
2l lkl54 Dependent and Neglected Chil-
dren; Conflict with Parental Rights 
211kl54.1 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
States have a compelling interest in and a solemn 
duty to protect the lives and health of the children 
within their borders; accordingly, when a child's 
life or health is endangered by her parents' de-
cisions, in some circumstances a state may inter-
vene without violating the parents' constitutional 
rights under the Due Frocess Clause. U.S.C.A. 
Const. Amend. 14. 
[21] Infants 211 €=>154.1 
211 Infants 
211VIII Dependent, Neglected, and Delinquent 
Children 
211 VIII(B) Subjects and Grounds 
2l lkl54 Dependent and Neglected Chil-
dren; Conflict with Parental Rights 
211kl54.1 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
When a child's life is under immediate threat, a 
state's interest in protecting the child is at its zenith, 
and a state has broad authority to intervene in par-
ental decisionmaking that produces the threat to the 
child's life. 
[22] Constitutional Law 92 € ^ 4 4 0 1 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVII Due Process 
92XXVII(G) Particular Issues and Applica-
tions 
92XXVII(G)18 Families and Children 
92k4400 Protection of Children; Child 
Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency 
92k4401 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Infants 211 €^>17 
211 Infants 
21111 Protection 
21 lkl7 k. Societies, agencies, and officers in 
general. Most Cited Cases 
State actors did not impose an undue burden on par-
ents' relationship with their minor child, and there-
fore did not violate parents' associational rights, as 
a result of their actions in state juvenile court legal 
dispute over child's custody and medical care after 
child was diagnosed with cancer; state's interest in 
protecting and safeguarding child's life was signi-
ficant, and the state afforded the parents numerous 
opportunities to obtain treatment for their child be-
fore it even sought to remove him from their cus-
tody. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[23] Constitutional Law 92 €^>1443 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XVI Freedom of Association 
92k 1443 k. Familial association. Most Cited 
Cases 
Under balancing test used to determine whether a 
plaintiffs right to familial association has been in-
fringed, a court balances the individual's interest in 
liberty against the State's asserted reasons for re-
straining individual liberty; the purpose of the bal-
ancing test is to ascertain whether a defendant's 
conduct constitutes an undue burden on the 
plaintiffs associational rights. 
[241 Constitutional Law 92 €^=>3867 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVII Due Process 
92XXVII(B) Protections Provided and 
Deprivations Prohibited in General 
92k3867 k. Procedural due process in 
general. Most Cited Cases 
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Procedural due process does not prevent the state 
from depriving an individual of liberty or property; 
it only requires that a fair procedure be provided for 
the deprivation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend, 14. 
[25] Constitutional Law 92 €==>3869 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVII Due Process 
92XXVII(B) Protections Provided and 
Deprivations Prohibited in General 
92k3868 Rights, Interests, Benefits, or 
Privileges Involved in General 
92k3869 k. In general. Most Cited 
As a threshold matter, a plaintiff must show that he 
possesses a constitutionally cognizable liberty or 
property interest before he can allege an unconstitu-
tional deprivation of that interest in violation of 
procedural due process. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14 . 
[261 Constitutional Law 92 <€>=>3869 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVII Due Process 
92XXVII(B) Protections Provided and 
Deprivations Prohibited in General 
92k3868 Rights, Interests, Benefits, or 
Privileges Involved in General 
92k3869 k. In general. Most Cited 
To be constitutionally cognizable under the proced-
ural due process analysis, an interest must rise to 
more than an abstract need or desire and must be 
based on more than a unilateral hope; indeed, a 
plaintiff must demonstrate a legitimate claim of en-
titlement to the asserted interest which may arise 
either from the Due Process Clause itself or state 
law. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[27] Constitutional Law 92 €^>3873 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVII Due Process 
92XXVII(B) Protections Provided and 
Deprivations Prohibited in General 
92k3868 Rights, Interests, Benefits, or 
Privileges Involved in General 
92k3873 k. Liberties and liberty in-
terests. Most Cited Cases 
A state creates a liberty interest protected by pro-
cedural due process by placing substantive limita-
tions on official discretion; state law, however, 
does not generally create a constitutionally cogniz-
able liberty interest simply by establishing substant-
ive predicates to govern official decision-making, 
but rather, the state must also mandate the outcome 
to be reached upon a finding that the relevant criter-
ia have been met; if state law establishes a substant-
ive predicate without mandating an outcome, the 
law creates nothing more than a right to process 
which is not a constitutionally cognizable liberty 
interest. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[28] Constitutional Law 92 €^>3867 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVII Due Process 
92XXVII(B) Protections Provided and 
Deprivations Prohibited in General 
92k3867 k. Procedural due process in 
general. Most Cited Cases 
Constitutional Law 92 €=^>3879 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVII Due Process 
92XXVII(B) Protections Provided and 
Deprivations Prohibited in General 
92k3878 Notice and Hearing 
92k3879 k. In general. Most Cited 
Once a procedural due process plaintiff establishes 
a constitutionally cognizable liberty or property in-
terest of which she has been deprived by the state, a 
court examines whether the procedures attendant 
upon that deprivation were constitutionally suffi-
cient; although the exact procedures required by the 
Constitution depend on the circumstances of a giv-
en case, the fundamental requirement of due pro-
cess is the opportunity to be heard at a meaningful 
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time and in a meaningful manner. U.S.C.A. 
Const. Amend. 14. 
[29] Constitutional Law 92 €=>4401 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVII Due Process 
92XXVII(G) Particular Issues and Applica-
tions 
92XXVII(G)18 Families and Children 
92k4400 Protection of Children; Child 
Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency 
92k4401 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Infants 211 €=>207 
211 Infants 
211VIII Dependent, Neglected, and Delinquent 
Children 
211VHI(D) Proceedings 
211k207 k. Reception of evidence; wit-
nesses. Most Cited Cases 
Allegations of parents involved in state juvenile 
court legal dispute over child's custody and medical 
care after child was diagnosed with cancer, that 
doctor who initially diagnosed the child's illness 
and referred the child's case to the state made mis-
representations to the juvenile court and to others 
involved with the custody dispute, did not support 
parents' claim that doctor violated their procedural 
due process rights, absent evidence that doctor's 
false testimony infected the judicial proceeding to 
the point that the proceeding itself became constitu-
tionally deficient. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
[30] Constitutional Law 92 € ^ 4 4 0 1 
92 Constitutional Law 
92XXVII Due Process 
92XXVII(G) Particular Issues and Applica-
tions 
92XXVII(G)18 Families and Children 
92k4400 Protection of Children; Child 
Abuse, Neglect, and Dependency 
92k4401 k. In general. Most Cited 
Cases 
Infants 211 €^=>11 
211 Infants 
21 III Protection 
211kl7 k. Societies, agencies, and officers in 
general. Most Cited Cases 
Parents of minor child failed to establish a constitu-
tionally cognizable liberty interest in an independ-
ent investigation by the Utah Division of Child and 
Family Services (DCFS) before the filing of a veri-
fied petition and motion to transfer custody and 
guardianship, in support of their procedural due 
process claim against DCFS social worker, despite 
argument that Utah statutes required the social 
worker to interview the parents and obtain an inde-
pendent medical examination of child before filing 
the verified petition, absent evidence that the Utah 
statutes mandated a specific outcome upon comple-
tion of the required DCFS investigation and a find-
ing that certain criteria were met during that invest-
igation. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 14. 
*1186 Karra J. Porter (Roger P. Christensen and 
Sarah E. Spencer, with her on the briefs), 
Christensen & Jensen, P.C., Salt Lake City, UT, ap-
pearing for Appellants/Cross-Appellees. 
Andrew M. Morse (David G. Williams and R. Scott 
Young, with him on the briefs), Snow, Christensen 
& Martineau, Salt Lake City, UT, appearing for 
Appellees/Cross-Appellants Wagner and Albritton. 
Bridget K. Romano, Assistant Attorney General ( 
Mark L. Shurtleff, Utah Attorney General, with her 
on the brief), Office of the Attorney General for the 
State of Utah, Salt Lake City, UT, appearing for 
Appellees Cunningham, Anderson, and Eisenman. 
Before TACHA, ALARCON,™* and 
TYMKOVICH, Circuit Judges. 
FN* Honorable Arthur L. Alarcon, Senior 
Circuit Judge, United States Court of Ap-
peals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by des-
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ignation. 
*1187 TACHA, Circuit Judge. 
There is perhaps no more delicate constitutional 
barrier protecting individual freedom from govern-
mental interference than that which protects against 
state interference with parental autonomy. The Su-
preme Court has long recognized that "[t]he child is 
not the mere creature of the state," Pierce v. Society 
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535, 45 S.Ct. 571, 69 
L.Ed. 1070 (1925), and that "the custody, care and 
nurture of the child reside first in the parents, 
whose primary function and freedom include pre-
paration for obligations the state can neither supply 
nor hinder." Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944). It is also 
well-settled, however, that "[a] democratic society 
rests for its continuance upon the healthy, well-
rounded growth of young people into full matur-
ity," and that states "may secure this against imped-
ing restraints and dangers within a broad range of 
selection." Id. at 168, 64 S.Ct. 438. Because of the 
importance of parental rights and the concomitant 
interest of the state in the health and safety of 
minor children within its borders, the intersection 
of individual freedom and state authority is always 
difficult to traverse when a child's life is at stake. 
This case arises at this difficult constitutional inter-
section and involves both parents and state actors 
who genuinely sought to do what they believed was 
best for a child who was tragically stricken with a 
life-threatening illness. We have jurisdiction under 
28 U.S.C. § 1291, and for the reasons discussed be-
low we REVERSE in part and AFFIRM in part the 
decision of the district court. 
I. BACKGROUND 
This 42 U.S.C. § 1983 case was initiated by P.J., a 
minor child, and his parents Daren and Barbara 
Jensen.FN1 The defendants are five state actors 
who were involved in the legal dispute in a Utah ju-
venile court over P.J.'s custody and medical care. 
Those state actors include: (1) Susan Eisenman, the 
Assistant Utah Attorney General who prosecuted 
the juvenile case on behalf of the state; (2) Dr. Kar-
en Albritton, the state's expert medical witness 
throughout the juvenile court proceedings; (3) Dr. 
Lars Wagner, the doctor at Primary Children's 
Medical Center ("PCMC") who initially diagnosed 
P.J.'s illness and who referred P.J.'s case to the 
state; (4) Kari Cunningham, the Utah Division of 
Child and Family Services ("DCFS") social worker 
who initiated the custody petition on behalf of the 
state; and (5) Richard Anderson, the DCFS director 
who, late in the proceedings, attempted to negotiate 
a resolution to P.J.'s case.™2 
FN1. Although P.J. is a named party, the 
Jensens do not assert any claims on appeal 
that implicate his independent rights. Ac-
cordingly, we only address Mr. and Mrs. 
Jensen's rights in this appeal. 
FN2. The Jensens named additional de-
fendants in their complaint, but they are no 
longer parties at this point in the litigation. 
On April 30, 2003, an oral surgeon removed a small 
growth from the floor of P.J.'s mouth. After laborat-
ory testing revealed that the growth was malignant, 
the surgeon referred the Jensens to PCMC where 
they ultimately met with Dr. Wagner in the hospit-
al's oncology department. On May 20, 2003, Dr. 
Amy Lowichik completed a pathology report on the 
growth removed from P.J.'s mouth. Dr. Cheryl 
Coffin, another pathologist, concurred in the report. 
The report diagnosed the growth as Ewing's sar-
coma, a rare form of cancer, based on a testing pro-
cedure known as immunohistochemical staining 
and on the morphology of the tumor cells. Dr. Wag-
ner discussed the pathology report* 1188 with Dr. 
Coffin, who expressed confidence in the diagnosis 
and explained that no further testing was necessary 
to confirm it, even though other tests such as cyto-
genetic or molecular testing were available. 
On May 21, 2003, Dr. Wagner met with the Jensens 
to explain P.J.'s diagnosis. During this consultation, 
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Dr. Wagner explained that P.J.'s disease was life 
threatening and expressed his belief that immediate 
chemotherapy treatment was necessary to save 
P.J.'s life. When the Jensens asked if any further 
tests could be performed to confirm the diagnosis, 
Dr. Wagner said no. The Jensens requested that Dr. 
Wagner send P.J.'s tissue sample to the Dana-
Faiber Cancer Institute at Harvard University for a 
second opinion. Dr. Wagner complied with this re-
quest; however, the Jensens ultimately canceled the 
Dana-Farber review. 
On May 29, 2003, the Jensens returned to PCMC to 
meet with Dr. Wagner. During this meeting, the 
Jensens requested that Dr. Wagner perform a 
Positron Emission Tomography ("PET") scan to 
confirm the Ewing's diagnosis. Dr. Wagner refused 
to order the PET scan, explained that such a test 
would not be useful, and stated that even a negative 
scan would not change his opinion that P.J. need 
immediate chemotherapy. The Jensens asked Dr. 
Wagner again if further testing could be performed 
to confirm P.J.'s diagnosis, and Dr. Wagner again 
said no. Additionally, the Jensens asked Dr. Wagn-
er to consider an alternative treatment to chemo-
therapy called Insulin Potentiation Therapy 
("DPT"). Dr. Wagner stated that he was unfamiliar 
with IPT but that he would examine it as an altern-
ative treatment method. After consulting with other 
doctors and performing independent research on 
IPT, Dr. Wagner concluded that there was insuffi-
cient data available about the treatment's safety and 
effectiveness, and it therefore was not a viable 
treatment option for P.J. 
On June 5, 2003, Dr. Wagner reported his conclu-
sions about IPT to the Jensens and reiterated his be-
lief that immediate chemotherapy treatment was ne-
cessary to save P.J.'s life. During this communica-
tion, Dr. Wagner also informed the Jensens of his 
legal and ethical duty to report P.J.'s case to DCFS 
if P.J.'s best medical interests were not being ad-
dressed. Because it appeared that Dr. Wagner and 
the Jensens had reached an impasse regarding the 
best course of treatment for P.J., a meeting among 
Dr. Wagner, the Jensens, and other PCMC staff was 
scheduled for June 9, 2003 at PCMC. During the 
June 9 meeting, Dr. Wagner again expressed his be-
lief that immediate chemotherapy was necessary to 
save P.J.'s life, and the head of PCMC's quality as-
surance department informed the Jensens that it 
may be necessary to refer P.J.'s case to DCFS. Nev-
ertheless, the Jensens refused to consent to chemo-
therapy and told the PCMC representatives that 
they were fired. 
On June 16, 2003, Dr. Wagner formally referred 
P.J.'s case to DCFS. Ms. Cunningham was assigned 
to the case. Ms. Cunningham believed, based on the 
information provided to her by Dr. Wagner and an-
other PCMC doctor, that P.J.'s situation presented a 
medical emergency that had to be addressed imme-
diately. Accordingly, she did not contact the Jen-
sens or perform any investigation; rather, she filed 
a Verified Petition and Motion to Transfer Custody 
and Guardianship ("verified petition") in the Utah 
juvenile court based entirely on the information she 
received from the doctors. The juvenile court set 
the first hearing on the verified petition for June 20, 
2003. 
Upon receiving notice of the verified petition, the 
Jensens obtained an attorney and had more tissue 
removed from *1189 P.J.'s mouth for independent 
testing. That tissue was sent to a pathologist at the 
University of Washington, who ultimately dia-
gnosed it as Ewing's sarcoma. Additionally, the 
Jensens contacted Dr. John Thomson, a radiation 
oncologist at LDS Hospital in Salt Lake City, Utah, 
who completed a written report on June 19, 2003, 
confirming the original diagnosis. The report stated, 
"It is my opinion that [P.J.] has a Stage 1 or Group 
1 nonosseous Ewing sarcoma with a favorable pro-
gnosis when treated to the standard of care with 
poly chemotherapy ... [and I] doubt that further 
pathologic evaluation would alter recommended 
therapy...." 
On June 20, 2003, the Jensens made their first ap-
pearance in the juvenile court. At the initial hear-
ing, the Jensens explained to the court that they 
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were seeking further tests. In addition, the Jensens 
and the state indicated that it might be possible to 
reach a stipulation regarding P.J.'s treatment. Ac-
cordingly, the juvenile court continued the hearing 
until July 10,2003. 
Around the time of the initial hearing, the Jensens 
contacted Dr. Jeorg Birkmayer, who practiced in 
Vienna, Austria. Dr. Birkmayer indicated that he 
was not "totally convinced" that PJ. had Ewing's 
sarcoma and suggested that he was not sure that 
chemotherapy was necessary. When Ms. Eisenman 
learned of the Jensens' contact with Dr. Birkmayer 
and their desire to have him supervise P.J.'s treat-
ment, she sent Dr. Birkmayer an e-mail in which 
she inquired about his qualifications and whether 
Austria had a similar standard of care to that in the 
United States. According to the Jensens, they ulti-
mately abandoned their plan to retain Dr. Birkmay-
er because DCFS insisted that P.J.'s medical care be 
provided by a board-certified pediatric oncologist, 
which Dr. Birkmayer apparently was not. 
At the July 10, 2003 hearing, the juvenile court sus-
tained an objection made by the Jensens' attorney 
which prevented DCFS from presenting evidence 
supporting its verified petition because the hearing 
had been set for a pre-trial conference and not an 
evidentiary hearing. The Jensens questioned wheth-
er P.J. actually had Ewing's sarcoma, but a stipula-
tion was reached under which the Jensens would 
have P.J. examined at the Children's Hospital of 
Los Angeles ("CHLA") and would abide by that 
hospital's treatment recommendations. Based on 
this stipulation, the juvenile court again continued 
the case until July 28, 2003. 
On July 21, 2003, the Jensens met with Dr. David 
Tishler at CHLA. During the consultation, Dr. 
Tishler informed the Jensens that he would wait to 
give his final recommendation until independent 
CHLA tests had been performed but that he was 
initially recommending chemotherapy treatment 
based on the tests that had already been completed. 
The Jensens were dissatisfied with Dr. Tishler's re-
commendation and, in violation of their stipulated 
agreement, they never returned to CHLA. Instead, 
the Jensens sought care from Dr. Charles Simone, a 
New Jersey doctor who ultimately refused to be in-
volved in P.J.'s case because he did not want to be-
come embroiled in a legal battle. 
At the July 28, 2003 hearing, the juvenile court re-
ceived testimony from Dr. Tishler. He stated that 
CHLA testing was not yet complete but that there 
was no question P.J. had a malignant tumor which 
required immediate chemotherapy. Dr. Tishler also 
testified that the specific tests being performed by 
CHLA would only serve to clarify the specific type 
of chemotherapy that would be best for P.J. The 
Jensens' attorney argued that not all testing had 
been completed and advocated for the Jensens' de-
sire to conduct additional* 1190 tests. The Jensens 
also expressed their preference that Dr. Simone 
serve as P.J.'s primary physician. DCFS's expert 
medical witness, Dr. Albritton, however, explained 
to the juvenile court that Dr. Simone should not be 
P.J.'s primary physician because he was not a 
board-certified pediatric oncologist. Dr. Tishler 
agreed and testified that "[tjhere's no other physi-
cian that could lead the care and provide the care." 
Based on Dr. Albritton's and Dr. Tishler's testi-
mony, the juvenile court ordered that P.J. begin re-
ceiving chemotherapy treatment by August 8, 2003, 
regardless of the results of the CHLA testing. Fur-
thermore, the juvenile court ordered that P.J.'s 
primary physician be a board-certified pediatric on-
cologist but that Dr. Simone could work with P.J. in 
conjunction with his other approved doctors. Fi-
nally, the juvenile court ordered an evidentiary 
hearing on the verified petition for August 20, 
2003, in the event that P.J.'s case was not yet re-
solved by then. 
On August 7, 2003, one day before P.J. was ordered 
to commence chemotherapy treatment, the Jensens 
obtained an appointment to meet with doctors at the 
Burzynski Clinic in Houston, Texas, on August 12. 
On August 8, the Jensens violated the juvenile 
court's order by taking P.J. out of Utah to a friend's 
lake house in Idaho rather than beginning the court-
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
603 F.3d 1182 
(Cite as: 603 F.3d 1182) 
Page 12 
ordered chemotherapy treatment. When Ms. Eisen-
man did not receive confirmation that P.J. had com-
menced chemotherapy treatment, she sought an im-
mediate hearing with the juvenile court for the pur-
pose of obtaining authorization to take P.J. into pro-
tective custody. Ms. Eisenman, Ms. Cunningham, 
Dr. Albritton, P.J.'s guardian ad litem, and the Jen-
sens' attorney participated in that hearing, which 
took place on August 8. At the hearing, the Jensens' 
attorney informed the juvenile court that P.J. was 
not receiving chemotherapy treatment, that the Jen-
sens did not want P.J. to receive chemotherapy 
treatment, and that the Jensens were going to have 
P.J. evaluated at the Burzynski Clinic. Dr. Albritton 
indicated that the Burzynski Clinic was not a suit-
able facility for P.J. because: Dr. Burzynski was not 
a board-certified pediatric oncologist; Dr. Albritton 
was not aware of any board-certified pediatric on-
cologists on staff at the Burzynski Clinic; and the 
Burzynski Clinic was not an appropriate treatment 
facility for newly-diagnosed cancer patients who 
had not exhausted standard treatment options. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, Ms. Eisenman 
filed an application to take P.J. into protective cus-
tody that was supported by affidavits from Dr. 
Wagner and Ms. Cunningham. The juvenile court 
ordered the custody transfer, and Ms. Eisenman 
contacted the Sandy City Police Department to ex-
ecute the warrant. The Sandy City Police were un-
able to serve the warrant, however, because the Jen-
sens had already left the state. When the Jensens' 
attorney informed them that the juvenile court had 
ordered that P.J. be taken into state custody to be-
gin chemotherapy treatment, the Jensens ignored 
the order and allegedly decided to continue with 
their plans to have P.J. evaluated at the Burzynski 
Clinic on August 12. 
On August 13, 2003, P.J.'s guardian ad litem filed a 
motion for an order to show cause in the juvenile 
court which ultimately resulted in that court's issu-
ance of a bench warrant for the Jensens' arrest and 
an order requiring the Jensens to appear and present 
P.J. Ms. Eisenman informed the Jensens' attorney 
and P.J.'s guardian ad litem that if the Jensens did 
not comply with the order she would contact local 
and federal law enforcement authorities. On August 
15, 2003, the Salt Lake County District Attorney's 
Office agreed to screen P.J.'s case at Ms. Eisen-
man's request and *1191 ultimately filed criminal 
charges of misdemeanor custodial interference and 
felony kidnaping against both Mr. and Mrs. Jensen. 
Although the Jensens claim they left Utah on Au-
gust 7 only to have a brief family vacation before 
taking P.J. to the Burzynski Clinic on August 12, 
the Jensens and P.J. were at Mrs. Jensen's parents' 
Idaho home on August 16, 2003, and had not yet 
been to the Burzynski Clinic. On that day, Mrs. 
Jensen allowed P.J. to drive the family car down 
her parents' long driveway to retrieve the mail. P.J. 
wrecked the vehicle, and neighbors who saw the ac-
cident called the police. Mrs. Jensen then fled her 
parents' home with P.J. in an effort to hide him 
from the authorities. When police arrived, Mr. 
Jensen falsely reported that P.J.'s brother had been 
driving the vehicle when the accident occurred. 
When officers realized there was a warrant for his 
arrest, they took Mr. Jensen into custody and he 
was released on bail four days later. Meanwhile, 
Mrs. Jensen attempted to take P.J. to the Burzynski 
Clinic in Houston, but she was turned away because 
of the Utah custody order. 
On August 20, 2003, the juvenile court held a hear-
ing at which the Jensens' attorney read a letter by 
Mr. Jensen and explained the Jensens' desire to 
present evidence. The juvenile court set an eviden-
tiary hearing, but refused to lift the warrants it had 
issued for the Jensens' arrest. Shortly after the Au-
gust 20 hearing, Ms. Eisenman assumed a new pos-
ition in the Utah Attorney General's Office and did 
not further participate in P.J.'s case. Around this 
time, Mr. Anderson was asked by a representative 
from the Utah governor's office to attempt to nego-
tiate a resolution with the Jensens. Accordingly, 
Mr. Anderson traveled to Idaho on August 27, 
2003, where he met with the Jensens for several days. 
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On September 5, 2003, the parties entered into a 
stipulated agreement under which the Jensens 
would submit P.J. to the care of Dr. Martin John-
ston, a board-certified pediatric oncologist in Boise, 
Idaho. The Jensens further agreed that they would 
abide by Dr. Johnston's treatment recommenda-
tions, even if he recommended chemotherapy. 
Based on these assurances, the juvenile court ap-
proved the stipulated agreement and returned full 
custody of PJ. to the Jensens. 
After evaluating P.J., Dr. Johnston informed the 
Jensens of his diagnosis and recommended treat-
ment. In a letter to the Jensens, Dr. Johnston stated, 
"There has never been any question but that the tu-
mor is a high-grade sarcoma, most compatible with 
a Ewing's sarcoma. After full review, I have arrived 
at the same conclusion." Dr. Johnston's letter also 
recommended chemotherapy treatment. In violation 
of the September 5 stipulation, however, the Jen-
sens refused to submit P.J. to chemotherapy treat-
ment and claimed that Dr. Johnston was merely 
rubber-stamping previous doctors' diagnoses. Addi-
tionally, Mr. Jensen threatened Dr. Johnston, stat-
ing that if P.J. ever received chemotherapy treat-
ment at Dr. Johnston's hospital, "I'm going to make 
sure it's a hellish experience for everybody in-
volved. I'm going to shut down this clinic, I'm go-
ing to shut down this hospital, and I'm going to 
fight you tooth and nail the whole way." 
On October 2, 2003, the Jensens entered into a plea 
agreement which resolved their criminal charges. 
Under the agreement, the Jensens pleaded guilty to 
the misdemeanor custodial interference charge in 
exchange for the state's promise to drop the felony 
kidnaping charge. The state dropped the felony 
charge and the Utah district court accepted the Jen-
sens' guilty *1192 plea in abeyance on the misde-
meanor charge. 
On October 8, 2003, Dr. Johnston informed the ju-
venile court that he had diagnosed P.J. with Ewing's 
sarcoma, that he had recommended chemotherapy 
treatment, and that the Jensens had refused to com-
mence his recommended treatment. Assistant Attor-
ney General Mark May, who had taken the case 
over from Ms. Eisenman, informed the juvenile 
court that the parties would attempt to reach a set-
tlement. Then, on October 22, 2003, DCFS filed a 
motion to dismiss the verified petition. In its mo-
tion, DCFS indicated that although it was confident 
that without chemotherapy treatment P.J.'s chance 
of survival would fall dramatically, the state had 
concluded that forcing PJ. to undergo chemother-
apy treatment had become unworkable because of 
the Jensens' refusal to obtain such treatment under 
any circumstances. Furthermore, DCFS indicated 
that the state's interest in the case had shifted such 
that attempting to force chemotherapy treatment 
and placing the Jensens in jail would no longer be 
in P.J.'s best interest and indeed may "impede [his] 
medical treatment." Accordingly, the juvenile court 
dismissed P.J.'s case and terminated its jurisdiction 
over the matter. 
In July 2005, the Jensens filed this § 1983 civil suit 
for damages in state court against eight state actors 
involved in P.J.'s case. After the case was removed 
to federal court and several defendants were dis-
missed, the Jensens' present claims against the five 
current defendants remained. The Jensens alleged 
that each of the five defendants remaining in this 
case violated their: (1) substantive due process right 
to direct P.J.'s medical care; (2) substantive due 
process right to familial association; (3) procedural 
due process rights; and (4) Fourth Amendment right 
to be free from unreasonable seizure based on the 
alleged malicious prosecution of the Jensens. All 
five defendants filed motions for summary judg-
ment based on claims of absolute or qualified im-
munity, and Dr. Albritton and Dr. Wagner argued 
that the entire case should be dismissed for lack of 
jurisdiction pursuant to the Rooker- Feldman doc-
trine. See Rooker v. Fid. Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 
44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed. 362 (1923); D.C Court of 
Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 
75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983). The district court rejected 
the doctors' Rooker- Feldman argument, concluded 
that Ms. Eisenman and Dr. Albritton were abso-
lutely immune from suit, concluded that the Jensens 
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failed to overcome the remaining defendants' 
claims of qualified immunity, and ultimately gran-
ted all five defendants' motions for summary judg-
ment. The Jensens appeal from the district court's 
summary judgment order, and Dr. Albritton and Dr. 
Wagner cross-appeal from the district court's denial 
of summary judgment based on their jurisdictional 
argument. 
II. DISCUSSION 
[1] We review de novo the district court's decision 
to grant each defendant summary judgment, view-
ing the facts in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party. Turner v. Public Serv. Co. of Colo., 
563 F.3d 1136, 1142 (10th Cir.2009). Summary 
judgment is appropriate when the record demon-
strates "that there is no genuine issue as to any ma-
terial fact and that the movant is entitled to judg-
ment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c)(2). 
Once the movant shows the absence of a genuine 
issue of material fact, the non-moving party "must 
bring forward specific facts showing a genuine is-
sue for trial as to those dispositive matters for 
which he or she carries the burden of proof." Gar-
rison v. Gambro, Inc., 428 F3d 933, 935 (10th 
Cir.2005). This requires the non-moving party to 
present sufficient facts *1193 that a reasonable jury 
could find in his or her favor. Id. 
A. Jurisdictional Issues-The Rooker-Feldman Doc-
trine 
[2] Because it implicates our subject matter juris-
diction, we address the cross-appellants' claim that 
the Rooker- Feldman doctrine bars this entire § 
1983 suit before turning to the merits of the case. 
See Crutchfield v. Countrywide Home Loans, 389 
F.3d 1144, 1147 (10th Cir.2004) (addressing Rook-
er- Feldman argument before considering the mer-
its and explaining that the issue is integral to sub-
ject matter jurisdiction). Generally, the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine precludes lower federal courts 
"from effectively exercising appellate jurisdiction 
over claims actually decided by a state court and 
claims inextricably intertwined with a prior state-
court judgment." Mo's Express, LLC v. Sopkin, 441 
F.3d 1229, 1233 (10th Cir.2006) (quotations omit-
ted). The Supreme Court recently clarified the nar-
row scope of the Rooker- Feldman doctrine, stating 
that it is "confined to cases of the kind from which 
the doctrine acquired its name: cases brought by 
state-court losers complaining of injuries caused by 
state-court judgments rendered before the district 
court proceedings commenced and inviting district 
court review and rejection of those judgments." Ex-
xon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 
U.S. 280, 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 161 L.Ed.2d 454 
(2005). 
In light of Exxon, we have concluded that "the type 
of judicial action barred by Rooker- Feldman [ ] 
consists of a review of the proceedings already con-
ducted by the 'lower' tribunal to determine whether 
it reached its result in accordance with law." 
Bolden v. City of Topeka, 441 F.3d 1129, 1143 
(10th Cir.2006). In this way, we have explained that 
" Rooker- Feldman does not bar federal-court 
claims that would be identical even had there been 
no state-court judgment; that is, claims that do not 
rest on any allegation concerning the state-court 
proceedings or judgment." Id. at 1145, 
Additionally, our recent Rooker- Feldman jurispru-
dence has emphasized the relief sought by federal-
court plaintiffs. See Mo's Express, LLC, 441 F.3d at 
1237 ("[W]e approach the [ Rooker- Feldman] 
question by asking whether the state-court judg-
ment caused, actually and proximately, the injury 
for which the federal-court plaintiff seeks redress. 
"). In Mo's Express, LLC, we concluded that feder-
al-court plaintiffs who only sought prospective in-
junctive and declaratory relief were not barred by 
the Rooker- Feldman doctrine because "their feder-
al suit would not reverse or otherwise 'undo' the re-
lief granted by the [state court]...." Id. at 1238. 
Conversely, we recently held that a federal-court 
plaintiffs claims seeking monetary damages from 
government actors who complied with probate 
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court orders unfavorable to the plaintiff were barred 
by the Rooker- Feldman doctrine because success 
on the claims "would require the district court to re-
view and reject [the probate court's] judgments." 
Mann v. Boatright, 477 F.3d 1140, 1147 (10th 
Cir.2007). 
Given this framework, we first identify the two 
state-court judgments adverse to the Jensens that 
neither the federal district court nor this court may 
review or undo in any way: (1) the juvenile court's 
August 8 order granting the state custody over P.J.; 
and (2) the state district court's October 2 order ac-
cepting the Jensens' guilty pleas for misdemeanor 
custodial interference. The district court concluded 
that none of the Jensens' claims are barred by the 
Rooker- Feldman doctrine because the 
"constitutional injury alleged by the Jensens is sep-
arate and independent from any orders of the state 
courts...." 
*1194 [3] On appeal, the Jensens base their sub-
stantive and procedural due process claims on mis-
representations allegedly made by the defendants 
during the juvenile court proceedings and with re-
spect to P.J.'s medical treatment, and on DCFS's al-
leged failure to conduct an independent investiga-
tion of P.J.'s case before filing the verified petition. 
Without addressing every underlying factual allega-
tion against each defendant here, we agree with the 
district court that each of these claims "seek[s] re-
lief independent from any judgment rendered by the 
state courts." Although the alleged misrepresenta-
tions and failure to investigate are closely connec-
ted to the juvenile court proceedings and the Jen-
sens' criminal prosecution, they are sufficiently ex-
tricable from any state-court judgment for Rooher-
Feldman purposes. Indeed, the Jensens' substantive 
and procedural due process claims would be 
identical even if there were no state-court orders 
adverse to the Jensens. Therefore, these claims do 
not allege "injuries caused by state-court judg-
ments," Exxon, 544 U.S. at 284, 125 S.Ct. 1517, 
and thus are not barred by the Rooker- Feldman 
doctrine. 
[4] Conversely, the Jensens' malicious prosecution 
claims necessarily invite federal-court undoing of 
the two adverse state-court orders. To succeed on 
their § 1983 malicious prosecution claims, the Jen-
sens must prove: (1) the defendants caused their 
continued confinement or prosecution; (2) some 
original action terminated in favor of the Jensens; 
(3) no probable cause supported the Jensens' origin-
al arrest, continued confinement, or prosecution; (4) 
the defendants acted with malice; and (5) the Jen-
sens sustained damages. Wilkins v. DeReyes, 528 
F.3d 790, 799 (10th Cir.2008). Accordingly, to sat-
isfy the third element of their malicious prosecution 
claims, the Jensens must convince a lower federal 
court that there was no probable cause for the pro-
secution of either the juvenile court proceedings or 
the criminal proceedings. As discussed above, 
however, those state-court proceedings resulted in 
adverse judgments for the Jensens. Therefore, a 
lower federal court would necessarily have to re-
view and reject those judgments in order for the 
Jensens to succeed on their malicious prosecution 
claims. 
Furthermore, "[t]he Fourth Amendment in the con-
text of a malicious prosecution claim deals with ju-
dicial determinations of probable cause...." Id. at 
802. And, the Jensens may only show the existence 
of a Fourth Amendment violation if they can show 
that the legal process itself was wrongful. Id, at 
798. We fail to see how a federal court could con-
clude that the juvenile proceedings or the Jensens' 
criminal prosecution themselves were wrongful 
without reviewing and, in essence, reversing the ad-
verse state-court judgments that were the products 
of those proceedings. Therefore, the Rooker- Feld-
man doctrine bars the Jensens' malicious prosecu-
tion claims. 
B. Absolute Immunity-Ms. Eisenman and Dr. Al-
britton 
[5][6][7] Next, we address the Jensens' claim that 
the district court erred by granting Ms. Eisenman 
and Dr. Albritton absolute immunity from this § 
©2010 Thomson Reuters. No Claim to Orig. US Gov. Works. 
603 F.3d 1182 
(Cite as: 603 F3d 1182) 
Page 16 
1983 suit.FN3 *1195 We review de novo a district 
court's conclusion that a defendant is entitled to ab-
solute immunity. Scott v. Hern, 216 F.3d 897, 908 
(10th Cir.2000). " '[A]bsolute immunity defeats a 
suit at the outset, so long as the official's actions 
were within the scope of the immunity.' " Spielman 
v. Hildebrand, 873 F.2d 1377, 1381 (10th Cir.1989) 
(quoting Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 419 n. 
13, 96 S.Ct. 984, 47 L.Ed.2d 128 (1976)). Under 
our functional approach to claims of absolute im-
munity, we examine whether the particular actions 
of the defendant are within the scope of the claimed 
immunity, not whether the status of the defendant 
or the office that she holds entitles her to protec-
tion. See, e.g., Perez v. Ellington, 421 F.3d 1128, 
1133 (10th Cir.2005). 
FN3. The district court also granted Ms. 
Cunningham absolute prosecutorial im-
munity for her decision to file the verified 
petition in juvenile court, but denied her 
absolute immunity for her other actions in 
this case. On appeal, the Jensens do not 
object to this conclusion and Ms. Cunning-
ham does not seek broader absolute im-
munity protection than what the district 
court granted her. Accordingly, we do not 
address the propriety of the district court's 
decision in this regard. 
1. Ms. Eisenman 
[8][9] "State attorneys ... who perform functions 
analogous to those of a prosecutor in initiating and 
pursuing civil and administrative enforcement pro-
ceedings are absolutely immune from suit under 
section 1983 concerning activities intimately asso-
ciated with the judicial process." Scott, 216 F.3d at 
908 (internal quotations omitted). Such government 
actors are not immune, however, for actions "that 
are primarily investigative or administrative in 
nature." Pfeiffer v. Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 929 F.2d 
1484, 1490 (10th Cir.1991). To distinguish between 
actions that are intimately associated with the judi-
cial process and those that are investigative or ad-
ministrative in nature, we look to whether the ac-
tions can rightly be considered advocacy "because 
that is the prosecutor's main function and the one 
most akin to his quasi-judicial role." Id. Further-
more, "absolute immunity may attach even to ... ad-
ministrative or investigative activities 'when these 
functions are necessary so that a prosecutor may 
fulfill his function as an officer of the court.' " Id. 
(quoting Snell v. Tunnell, 920 F.2d 673, 693 (10th 
Or. 1990)). 
[10] The Jensens base their claims against Ms. Eis-
enman on: (1) misrepresentations she allegedly 
made to the juvenile court; (2) her research regard-
ing the American Academy of Pediatrics's 
guidelines for clinicians who render pediatric care 
and her resistance to the Jensens' attempt to have 
P.J. treated by doctors who were not qualified un-
der those guidelines; and (3) misrepresentations she 
allegedly made to the Salt Lake County District At-
torney. The undisputed evidence demonstrates that 
any statements Ms. Eisenman made to the juvenile 
court were made in her role as an advocate for the 
state's interest in the custody dispute. Likewise, any 
research Ms. Eisenman performed regarding the ap-
propriate type of doctor for P.J. and any actions she 
took to ensure that P.J. was treated by an appropri-
ately credentialed doctor were intimately associated 
with the judicial process and Ms. Eisenman's role 
as an advocate for the state. Therefore, those ac-
tions are clearly within the scope of Ms. Eisenman's 
claimed absolute immunity. 
[11][12] The protection afforded Ms. Eisenman's 
statements to the Salt Lake County District Attor-
ney, however, is less clear. The Jensens argue that 
by making misrepresentations to the Salt Lake 
County District Attorney which eventually led to 
their criminal prosecution, Ms. Eisenman was act-
ing as a complaining witness rather than as a pro-
secutor. Furthermore, the Jensens correctly point 
out that a complaining witness is not entitled to ab-
solute immunity. See Malley v. Briggs, 475 U.S. 
335, 340-41, 106 S.Ct. 1092, 89 L.Ed.2d 271 
(1986). Under the circumstances of this case, 
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however, we agree with the district court that Ms. 
Eisenman's presentation of facts to the Salt Lake 
County District Attorney was intimately *1196 as-
sociated with the juvenile court process and was 
done in Ms. Eisenman's role as an advocate for the 
state. The day Ms. Eisenman met with the Salt Lake 
County District Attorney, the juvenile court had 
ordered the Jensens to present P.J. to the court for 
the purpose of beginning chemotherapy treatment. 
The Jensens were aware of this juvenile court order 
and had, in fact, stated their intention not to comply 
with it. Furthermore, the Jensens admit they were 
attempting to hide P.J. from state authorities in or-
der to prevent the effectuation of the juvenile court 
order. Under these circumstances, Ms. Eisenman's 
presentation of evidence to the Salt Lake County 
District Attorney was necessary to effectuate the ju-
venile court's order and to pursue the interest of the 
state in ensuring that P.J. receive treatment for his 
life-threatening illness. Accordingly, these actions 
were necessary to fulfill both her roles as officer of 
the court and advocate for the state, and are there-
fore protected by absolute immunity. 
2. Dr. Albritton 
[13][14] Like the absolute immunity afforded pro-
secutors who perform actions intimately associated 
with the judicial process, "[t]he immunity of parties 
and witnesses from subsequent damages liability 
for their testimony in judicial proceedings is well 
established in the common law...." Spielman, 873 
F.2d at 1382. Testifying witness immunity is 
"supported by the public policy of preserving the 
truthfinding process from distortions caused by fear 
of suit." Id. The Jensens' claims against Dr. Albrit-
ton center on her testimony before the juvenile 
court; the Jensens allege that her testimony con-
tained various misrepresentations and "had more 
the flavor of someone working to perpetuate pro-
ceedings (i.e., a complaining witness), than merely 
providing objective information." This contention 
reflects a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
well-established immunity for testifying witnesses. 
A witness is absolutely immune from civil liability 
based on any testimony the witness provides during 
a judicial proceeding "even if the witness knew the 
statements were false and made them with malice." 
Briscoe v. LaHue, 460 U.S. 325, 332, 103 S.Ct 
1108, 75 L.Ed.2d 96 (1983). Thus, even if Dr. Al-
britton's testimony was aimed at perpetuating the 
custody proceedings against the Jensens, she is pro-
tected by absolute immunity. Accordingly, Dr. Al-
britton is absolutely immune from any claims 
against her in this § 1983 suit. 
C. Qualified Immunity-Dr. Wagner, Ms. Cunning-
ham, and Mr. Anderson 
[15] Finally, we address the Jensens' constitutional 
claims against Dr. Wagner, Ms. Cunningham, and 
Mr. Anderson, who have all claimed a defense of 
qualified immunity. "When a defendant pleads 
qualified immunity, the plaintiff has the heavy bur-
den of establishing: (1) that the defendant's actions 
violated a federal constitutional or statutory right; 
and (2) that the right violated was clearly estab-
lished at the time of the defendant's actions." Scott, 
216 F.3d at 910 (quotations omitted). Federal courts 
may "exercise their sound discretion in deciding 
which of the two prongs of the qualified immunity 
analysis should be addressed first in light of the cir-
cumstances in the particular case at hand." Pearson 
v. Callahan, — U.S. — , 129 S.Ct. 808, 818, 172 
L.Ed.2d 565 (2009). 
[16] [17] The "clearly established" prong of the 
qualified immunity analysis ensures that govern-
mental actors are given fair warning that their con-
duct is unconstitutional before they are held liable 
for damages based on that conduct. Harman v. Pol-
lock, 586 F.3d 1254, 1260 (10th Cir.2009). A right 
is clearly established "when a Supreme Court or 
Tenth Circuit *1197 decision is on point, or if the 
clearly established weight of authority from other 
courts shows that the right must be as [the] plaintiff 
maintains." Id. at 1261. That does not mean that we 
must have previously decided a case that is materi-
ally factually similar or identical to the present 
case; instead, "[t]he contours of the right must be 
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sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would 
understand that what he is doing violates that 
right." Anderson v. Creighton, 483 U.S. 635, 640, 
107 S.Ct. 3034, 97 L.Ed.2d 523 (1987). 
1. The Jensens' Substantive Due Process Right to 
Direct P.J. 's Medical Care 
[18] The district court concluded that the Jensens 
failed to show that any defendant violated their 
right to direct P.J.'s medical care. Because the dis-
trict court decided this issue under the first prong of 
the qualified immunity analysis, it did not have oc-
casion to consider whether the Jensens' right to dir-
ect P.J.'s medical care in the circumstances presen-
ted in this case was clearly established at the time 
of the alleged violations. Furthermore, on appeal, 
the Jensens confine their argument to the first prong 
of the qualified immunity analysis and assume that 
under the circumstances of this case their right to 
direct P.J.'s medical care is clearly established. We 
reject this assumption and conclude that the Jen-
sens' right to direct P.J.'s medical care in this case-
if any right indeed exists in such circumstances-was 
not. clearly established at the time the Jensens allege 
the right was violated. 
[19] We begin by acknowledging that the Due Pro-
cess Clause generally provides constitutional pro-
tection for parental rights. Indeed, the Supreme 
Court has stated that "the Due Process Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment protects the fundamental 
right of parents to make decisions concerning the 
care, custody, and control of their children." Troxel 
v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 66, 120 S.Ct. 2054, 147 
L.Ed.2d 49 (2000). Furthermore, although we have 
never specifically recognized or defined the scope 
of a parent's right to direct her child's medical care, 
see Roska v. Peterson, 328 F.3d 1230, 1247 n. 14 
(10th Cir.2003) ("We express no opinion on wheth-
er such a right [to direct a child's medical care] 
might exist within the context of general familial 
rights."), we do not doubt that a parent's general 
right to make decisions concerning the care of her 
child includes, to some extent, a more specific right 
to make decisions about the child's medical care. 
See Dubbs v. Head Start, Inc., 336 F.3d 1194, 1203 
(10th Cir.2003) ("It is not implausible to think that 
rights invoked here-the right to refuse a medical ex-
am and the parent's right to control the upbringing, 
including the medical care, of a child-fall within 
[the Due Process Clause's] sphere of protected 
liberty."). 
The Supreme Court has similarly alluded to, but 
never specifically defined the scope of a parent's 
right to direct her child's medical care. Indeed, the 
Court has recognized that "[m]ost children, even in 
adolescence, simply are not able to make sound 
judgments concerning ... their need for medical care 
or treatment," Parham v. JR., 442 U.S. 584, 603, 
99 S.Ct. 2493, 61 L.Ed.2d 101 (1979), and that our 
legal system presumes "that natural bonds of affec-
tion lead parents to act in the best interests of their 
children." Id. at 602., 99 S.Ct. 2493 Therefore, this 
precedent reasonably suggests that the Due Process 
Clause provides some level of protection for par-
ents' decisions regarding their children's medical 
care. 
[20] The Supreme Court has long recognized, 
however, that parental rights, including any right to 
direct a child's medical *1198 care, are not abso-
lute. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 
166, 64 S.Ct. 438, 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944) ("[N]either 
rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are bey-
ond limitation."); see also Parham, 442 U.S. at 604, 
99 S.Ct. 2493 ("[P]arents cannot always have abso-
lute and unreviewable discretion to decide whether 
to [seek specific medical care for their children]," 
but they "retain plenary authority to seek such care 
for their children, subject to a physician's independ-
ent examination and medical judgment."). Indeed, 
states have a compelling interest in and a solemn 
duty to protect the lives and health of the children 
within their borders. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper 
Co. v. Superior Court for Norfolk County, 457 U.S. 
596, 607, 102 S.Ct. 2613, 73 L.Ed.2d 248 (1982) 
("[Safeguarding the physical and psychological 
well-being of a minor ... is a compelling 
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[interest]."). Accordingly, when a child's life or 
health is endangered by her parents' decisions, in 
some circumstances a state may intervene without 
violating the parents' constitutional rights. See Par-
ham, 442 U.S. at 603, 99 S.Ct. 2493 (u[W]e have 
recognized that a state is not without constitutional 
control over parental discretion in dealing with 
children when their physical or mental health is 
jeopardized."). 
Under this constitutional framework, we conclude 
that the Jensens' asserted right to direct P.J.'s med-
ical care in this case is not clearly established. The 
record demonstrates that no less than seven quali-
fied and competent doctors evaluated P.J., dia-
gnosed him with life-threatening cancer, and re-
commended that he immediately undergo chemo-
therapy treatment in order to save his life. In this 
particular situation, the Jensens did not have a 
clearly established constitutional right to refuse the 
unanimous recommended treatment or to solicit ad-
ditional opinions until they found a doctor who dis-
agreed that conventional treatment was necessary. 
Indeed, the Jensens had a " 'high duty' to recognize 
symptoms of illness and to seek and follow medical 
advice." Id. at 602., 99 S.Ct. 2493 
[21] Furthermore, when a child's life is under im-
mediate threat, a state's interest in protecting the 
child is at its zenith, and a state has broad authority 
to intervene in parental decisionmaking that pro-
duces the threat to the child's life. See Prince, 321 
U.S. at 167, 64 S.Ct. 438 ("[T]he state has a wide 
range of power for limiting parental freedom and 
authority in things affecting the child's welfare."). 
Here, the state was endowed with this broad author-
ity, and the Jensens do not direct us to a clearly es-
tablished constitutional line that defines what a 
state can and cannot do to protect a child whose life 
is compromised by his parents' refusal to obtain 
medical care. Certainly, the Jensens do not assert 
any factual allegation that is substantially supported 
in the record which would constitute state action 
that is clearly outside the state's "wide range of 
power." Accordingly, under the circumstances of 
this case, the Jensens' asserted right to direct P.J.'s 
medical care was not clearly established at the time 
of the alleged violations; therefore, they cannot 
overcome the defendants' claims of qualified im-
munity. 
2. The Jensens' Substantive Due Process Right to 
Familial Association 
[22] In contrast to the Jensens' purported right to 
direct P.J.'s medical care in this case, we resolve 
their claims regarding their substantive due process 
right to familial association and their procedural 
due process rights on the first prong of the qualified 
immunity inquiry-namely, that the Jensens have not 
shown a violation of their constitutional rights. 
[23] More than twenty-five years ago the Supreme 
Court recognized that "[fjamily relationships, by 
their nature, involve deep attachments and commit-
ments to the necessarily few other individuals with 
*1199 whom one shares not only a special com-
munity of thoughts, experiences, and beliefs but 
also distinctively personal aspects of one's life." 
Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 619-620, 
104 S.Ct. 3244, 82 L.Ed.2d 462 (1984). Shortly 
thereafter, this court first recognized the existence 
of a right to familial association within the sub-
stantive rights protected by the Due Process Clause. 
See Griffin v. Strong, 983 F.2d 1544, 1546-47 (10th 
Cir.1993) (discussing the development of the right 
of familial association in the Tenth Circuit). In nu-
merous decisions since the right was first recog-
nized, we have applied a balancing test to determ-
ine whether the plaintiffs right to familial associ-
ation has been infringed. See, e.g., id. at 1547-49; 
J.B. v. Washington County, 127 F.3d 919, 927 (10th 
Cir.1997); Lowery v. County of Riley, 522 F.3d 
1086, 1092 (10th Cir.2008). Under this test, "we 
balance 'the individual's interest in liberty against 
the State's asserted reasons for restraining individu-
al liberty.' " Lowery, 522 F.3d at 1092 (quoting 
Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 320, 102 S.Ct. 
2452, 73 L.Ed.2d 28 (1982)). The purpose of the 
balancing test is to ascertain whether a defendant's 
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conduct constitutes an undue burden on the 
plaintiffs associational rights. Griffin, 983 F.2d at 
1547. 
Because the Jensens1 opening brief fails to articu-
late a particularized factual allegation that any de-
fendant violated their associational rights, we ad-
dress their general claims under the balancing test 
discussed above. First, the Jensens' interest in asso-
ciating with P.J. is unquestionably of paramount 
importance. See id. at 1548 ("The right to associate 
with one's family is a very substantial right."); see 
also U.S. Jaycees, 468 U.S. at 618, 104 S.Ct. 3244 
("[Fjreedom of association receives protection as a 
fundamental element of personal liberty."). Second, 
as discussed above, the state's interest in protecting 
and safeguarding P.J.'s life is also significant. Fi-
nally, given these countervailing interests, the re-
cord demonstrates that the actual burden on the Jen-
sens' right to associate with P.J. was minimal in this 
case. The Jensens correctly point out that "the 
forced separation of parent from child, even for a 
short time, represents a serious impingement." J.B., 
127 F.3d at 925 (alteration omitted). In this case, 
however, PJ. was never physically removed from 
the Jensens' custody and the state afforded the Jen-
sens numerous opportunities to obtain treatment for 
P.J. before it even sought to remove him from their 
custody. Under these circumstances, the Jensens 
fail to show that any defendant imposed an undue 
burden on their relationship with P.J. and therefore 
fail to show a violation of their associational rights. 
3. The Jensens' Procedural Due Process Rights 
[24][25][26] "[Procedural due process does not 
prevent the state from depriving an individual of 
liberty or property. It only requires that a fair pro-
cedure be provided for the deprivation." Doyle v. 
Okla. Bar Ass'n, 998 F.2d 1559, 1569 (10th 
Cir.1993). As a threshold matter, a plaintiff must 
show that he possesses a constitutionally cogniz-
able liberty or property interest before he can allege 
an unconstitutional deprivation of that interest. Id. 
To be constitutionally cognizable, "the interest 
must rise to more than an abstract need or desire 
and must be based on more than a unilateral hope." 
Ky. Dep't of Corr. v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460, 
109 S.Ct. 1904, 104 L.Ed.2d 506 (1989) (internal 
quotations and citations omitted). Indeed, to satisfy 
the threshold requirement, a plaintiff must demon-
strate a legitimate claim of entitlement to the asser-
ted interest which may arise either from the Due 
Process Clause itself or state law. Id. 
*1200 [27] " 'A state creates a protected liberty in-
terest by placing substantive limitations on official 
discretion.' " Doyle, 998 F.2d at 1569 (quoting 
Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 249, 103 S.Ct. 
1741, 75 L.Ed.2d 813 (1983)) (alteration omitted). 
State law, however, does not generally create a con-
stitutionally cognizable liberty interest simply "by 
establishing substantive predicates to govern offi-
cial decision-making"; rather, the state must also 
"mandatfe] the outcome to be reached upon a find-
ing that the relevant criteria have been met." 
Thompson, 490 U.S. at 462, 109 S.Ct. 1904 
(quotations and citations omitted). If state law es-
tablishes a substantive predicate without mandating 
an outcome, the law creates nothing more than a 
right to process which is not a constitutionally cog-
nizable liberty interest. See Doyle, 998 F.2d at 1570 
("The mere expectation of receiving a state af-
forded process does not itself create an independent 
liberty interest protected by the Due Process 
Clause."). 
[28] Once a procedural due process plaintiff estab-
lishes a constitutionally cognizable liberty or prop-
erty interest of which she has been deprived by the 
state, we "examine [ ] whether the procedures at-
tendant upon that deprivation were constitutionally 
sufficient." Thompson, 490 U.S. at 460, 109 S.Ct. 
1904. Although the exact procedures required by 
the Constitution depend on the circumstances of a 
given case, "[t]he fundamental requirement of due 
process is the opportunity to be heard at a meaning-
ful time and in a meaningful manner." Mathews v. 
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 
L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) (internal quotations omitted). 
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[29] The Jensens allege procedural due process 
claims only against Dr Wagner and Ms Cunning-
ham™4 They base their claim agamst Dr Wagner 
on misrepresentations he allegedly made to the ju-
venile court and to others involved with the custody 
dispute The Jensens appear to argue that these mis-
representations infected the juvenile proceedmgs to 
the pomt that they did not afford the Jensens the op-
portunity to be heard "in a meaningful manner " Al-
though we can conceive of circumstances m which 
false testimony may infect a judicial proceeding to 
the pomt that the proceeding itself becomes consti-
tutionally deficient, Cf United States v Vaziri, 164 
F 3d 556, 563 (10th Cir 1999) (concluding that a 
criminal conviction obtamed by perjured testimony 
violates due process under certain circumstances), 
the Jensens have not demonstrated that any state-
ments by Dr Wagner had such a degenerative ef-
fect on the juvenile court proceedings m this case 
Accordingly, the Jensens have not met their burden 
of showmg that Dr Wagner violated their proced-
ural due process rights 
FN4 The Jensens cursorily allege that all 
defendants made misrepresentations that 
violated their procedural due process 
rights, however, they make no specific fac-
tual allegations agamst Mr Anderson Ac-
cordingly, we do not read the Jensens' 
opening brief as asserting a procedural due 
process claim agamst Mr Anderson 
[30] The Jensens base their procedural due process 
claim against Ms Cunningham on her failure to in-
dependently investigate the medical neglect allega-
tions made by Dr Wagner before filing the verified 
petition m the juvenile court Specifically, the Jen-
sens argue that Utah statutes required Ms Cunning-
ham to interview the Jensens and obtain an inde-
pendent medical examination of P J before filing 
the verified petition Thus, the Jensens claim a con-
stitutionally cognizable liberty interest m an inde-
pendent investigation by DCFS As discussed 
above, however, a right to process under state law 
is not itself a liberty mterest protected by the Due 
Process Clause, rather, state law *1201 must also 
mandate a specific outcome upon a finding that cer-
tain catena are met Doyle, 998 F 2d at 1570 The 
Jensens do not point to any Utah statutes that man-
date a specific outcome upon completion of the re-
quired DCFS investigation and a finding that cer-
tain criteria are met during that investigation Ac-
cordingly, the Jensens fail to establish any constitu-
tionally cognizable liberty interest and thus fail to 
meet the threshold requirement for a procedural due 
process claim agamst Ms Cunningham 
ffl. CONCLUSION 
Because parental autonomy is fundamental to our 
democracy and culture and a state's interest m pro-
tecting the health and safety of mmor children is 
compelling, state actors who are responsible for in-
tervening m parental relationships must always 
make difficult decisions that may have constitution-
al implications Accordmgly, such state actors oper-
ate on one of the most delicate constitutional bann-
ers in our legal system and their good faith actions 
to protect children must also be protected by our 
laws In this case, the Jensens fail to show that any 
defendant violated their clearly established consti-
tutional rights Moreover, we conclude that we lack 
jurisdiction under the Rooker- Feldman doctrine to 
consider their claim premised on malicious prosec-
ution Therefore, for the foregomg reasons, the de-
cision of the district court is REVERSED m part 
and AFFIRMED in part The defendants' requests 
for attorneys fees and costs are denied 
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